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" . .. we leave prior decisional law as we find it and simply
apply it to the case at bar."
Justice William H. Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Bell
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1984, hopes ran high among advocates for
children all over the country that the courts were sounding the
deathknell for juvenile preventive detention. Preventive detention,2
in any form, had never been upheld by the nation's highest Court. 3
441 U.S. 520, 535 n.17 (1979).
2
 "Preventive detention" is post-arrest, pre-conviction detention of alleged criminals
based upon a judicial finding that the criminal is dangerous. For the New York preventive
detention statute, see infra note 28 and accompanying text.
'See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1022 (1982) (District of Columbia Court of Appeals held the D.C. adult preventive detention
statute constitutional). As of April, 1985 the United States Supreme Court had not decided
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A New York federal district court in United States ex rel. Martin v.
Strasburg had already struck down the state's juvenile preventive
detention statute as violative of due process on its face. 4 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit subsequently af-
firmed Strasburg.'
The district court found that New York family court judges
routinely remanded alleged juvenile delinquents to secure detention
during an initial arraignment averaging only five to fifteen minutes."
These judges, the district court found, detained children based on
"intuition and [their] personal predilections, the antithesis of rea-
soned action."' Eighteen years of constitutional jurisprudence,
commencing with In re Gault,' had construed the Constitution to
protect the rights of accused juveniles through stringent procedural
safeguards in order to avoid punishment of presumptively innocent
persons. Thus, in the spring of 1984, many advocates for children
were confident that the Supreme Court would definitively strike
down preventive detention as unconstitutional.
In the summer of 1984, however, a 6-3 majority of the Su-
preme Court decided Schall v. Martin, 9 and its decision has puzzled
the juvenile justice community. Replete with citation to cases that
whether preventive detention statutes violate the eighth amendment of the United States
Constitution. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 968 n.164
(1985).
1 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) [hereinafter Strasburg I].
Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Strasburg II].
"See Strasburg I, 513 F. Supp. at 708. In 1981, when Strasburg I was decided, the New
York Family Court Act defined a secure facility as a facility "characterized by physically
restricting construction, hardware and procedures." N.Y. FAM. Cr. AcT § 712(d) (McKinney
1975 & Supp. 1981) (currently N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(4) (McKinney 1983)). A "non-
secure" facility was characterized by the absence of those features. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(c)
(McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1981) (currently N.Y. F./kW CT. ACT § 301.2(5) (McKinney 1983).
The district court noted that the "secure facility has a more authoritarian atmosphere."
Strasburg I, 513 F. Supp. at 695 n.5.
City officials screen children for non-secure or secure detention after the judicial deten-
tion decision. See Strasburg 1, 513 F. Supp. at 703. According to evidence adduced in Strasburg
I, the majority of juvenile delinquents are adz -Anted to secure facilities. In 1979, for instance,
according to Director or Detention Services Michael Bigley, 8,557 juveniles were admitted to
secure facilities and 1,216 to non-secure facilities, According to the report of the Chief
Administrator for that same year, only 4,783 juveniles were placed in secure facilities; this,
however, is still four times as many as were placed in non-secure settings. Strasburg 1, 513 F.
Supp. at 703 n.8.
7 1d. at 713.
387 U.S. I (1967); see infra notes 83-97 and 115=29 for a discussion of the Wall
majority's misuse of In re Gault.
9 467  U.S. 253 (1984). Then Associate Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion,
joined by Chief justice Burger, and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell and O'Connor. Justice
Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Stevens joined. Schall, 467
U.S. at 281 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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might ordinarily lead to invalidation of pre-trial detention,") the
opinion nevertheless upheld pre-trial detention as constitutional."
Scholars and practitioners have been challenging the Schall
decision since 1984. Many have explored the discontinuity between
Schall and the line of juvenile rights cases surrounding Gaule.' 2
Others have focused upon the Schall opinion's effect on jurispru-
dence regarding adult criminal defendants.' 5 By focusing on the
Court's reasoning in light of secure preventive detention, this arti-
cle, however, will explore the extent to which distortion of precedent
drives the Schall opinion. The Schall opinion, claiming to apply
precedent, instead transforms established principles. The opinion
claims support through citations to Gault," Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 15 Mathews v. Eldridge,i 6 and Gerstein v. Pugh," but it is the
distortion of these cases that forms the basis of the decision.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); In
re Gault, 387 U.S, 1 (1967); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
11 Scholl, 467 U.S. at 281.
15 For an excellent discussion and extensive bibliography of the genesis of the Juvenile
Court movement and Gault and its progeny, including Schall, see Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile
Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 142-64, 191-209 (1984).
Note, Supreme Court Holds juvenile Preventive Detention Under New York Statute Not Violative of
Due Process: Schall v, Martin, 26 B.C.L. REV. 1277, 1281-88 (1985); Note, Juvenile Justice—
Preventive Detention of juveniles: Have They Held Your Child Today? Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct.
2403 (1984), 1985 S. ILI.. U.L.J. 315, 316-19 (1985) [hereinafter Have They Held Your Child
Today?]. For a discussion of Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966), a precursor of Gault, in
connection with the background and jurisprudence of the juvenile court see Note, constitu-
tional Law—Pretrial Preventive Detention—Pretrial detention of an accused juvenile delinquent who
poses a serious threat of recidivism does not violate due process, Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403
(1984), 62 U. DE:r. L. REV. 145, 148-52 (1984); Note, Juvenile Law—What Ever Happened to
In Re Gault and Fundamental Fairness in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings?, 22 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 347, 349-57 (1987). For additional discussion of the juvenile court movement and
jurisprudence in light of Scholl, see Rosenberg, Schall v. Martin: A Child is a Child is a Child,
12 Am. J. GRIM. LAW 253, 256-58 (1984); Note, Where Have All the Children Gone? The Supreme
Court Finds Pretrial Detention of Minors Constitutional: Schall v. Martin, 34 DE PAUL L. REV.
733, 734-40 (1985); Note, The Constitutionality of juvenile Preventive Detention: Schaff v. Martin
— Who Is Preventive. Detention Protecting?, 20 NEW ENG. L. REV. 341, 341-47 (1984-85)
[hereinafter Who is Preventive Detention Protecting?]; Comment, The Supreme Court and Pretrial
Detention of Juveniles: A Principled Solution to a Due Process Dilemma, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 98-
101 (1983) (also contains helpful references).
17 See, e.g., Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Ap-
proaches to Due Process, 85 Micu. L. REV. 510 (1986); Ewing, Schall v. Martin: Preventive
Detention and Dangerousness Through the Looking Glass, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 173 (1985); Gold-
kamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM, L. & CRIMINOLOGY
I (1985): &miff, Controlling the Dangers of Dangerousness: The ABA Standards and Beyond, 53
Geo. WASH. L. REV. 562 (1985); Comment, Pretrial Detainment: The Fruitless Search for the
Presumption of Innocence, 47 Outo ST. L.J. 277 (1986).
14 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
0 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
°424 U.S. 319 (1976).
' 7 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
March 1990] TRANSFORMATION OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
	 645
Once these distortions have been revealed, the ripple effect of
the Schall transformation becomes evident. For example, the first
case to rely upon Schall, United States v. Salerno,'s is grounded in
Schall's distortion of precedent. In Salerno, the Court upheld pre-
ventive detention for adults under the Federal Bail Reform Act of
1984.' 9 Through Schall and Salerno, five important constitutional
doctrines have been dramatically transformed: (1) the interaction
of the state's parens patriae duty and the juvenile's right to liberty,
(2) the substantive due process distinction between an impermissibly
punitive and a permissibly regulatory governmental practice, (3) the
parameters of acceptable post-arrest detention, (4) the structure of
procedural due process, and (5) the presumption of innocence. All
of these transformations stem from distortions of the precedents
upon which Schall and Salerno purport to rely. In view of its pow-
erful effect, Schall represents a significant turning point in the law.
Because its significance has been disguised because of the illusion
of continuity with precedent, the distortions upon which the deci-
sion rests must now be brought to light.
Section two of this essay briefly describes the structure and
conclusions of the Schall opinion.20
 Section three reviews six major
precedential distortions in Schall, exploring the way these flaws
pervade the structure and execution of the majority's legal analy-
sis. 21
 Section four explores how the ripple effect from Schall has
already altered the established path of five constitutional doctrines
in both criminal and civil jurisprudence. 22
 Finally, the conclusion
reflects on the dangers posed by the opinion in its broader context
and suggests areas for further research and investigation."
II. OVERVIEW OF THE SCHALL OPINION
The Schall opinion is divided into three main sections. Section
one discusses briefly the factual background and procedural history
of the litigation. 24 Section two analyzes whether the preventive de-
' 9
 United States v Salerno, 107 S, Ct. 2095 (1987).
' 9 /d. at 2098,2105.
20 See infra note, 24-50 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 51-201 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 202-246 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 247-252 and accompanying text.
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,257-62 (1984).
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tention statute satisfies the requirements of the due process clause. 25
Section three concludes by summarily rebutting arguments offered
by the dissent against the majority's holding."
In Schall, three juveniles brought a class action habeas corpus
proceeding for declaratory judgment invalidating the New York
state juvenile preventive detention statute as unconstitutional under
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. 27 The statute, Family Court Act ("FCA") section
739(a)(ii), provided:
[alt the initial appearance, the court in its discretion may
release the respondent or direct his detention. In exercis-
ing its discretion under this section, the court shall not
direct detention unless it finds and states the facts and
reasons for so finding that unless the respondent is de-
tained:
(ii) there is a serious risk that he may before the return
date do an act which if committed by an adult would
constitute a crime."
In reviewing the case . before it, the Schall majority stated that
"[t]wo separate inquiries are necessary" to determine whether ju-
25 See id. at 263-81.
2° Id. at 281.
27 Id. at 260-61.
22 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 739(a)(iii) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1981). The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Robert L. Carter, J.) held that the
statutory scheme, which allowed five days incarceration before detention was justified, con-
stituted a punitive measure violative of due process on its face and as applied. Strasburg
513 F. Supp. 691, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). A three-judge panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the statutory scheme
and practice violate due process to the extent that pretrial detention is used primarily to
impose punishment before adjudication of guilt or innocence. Strasburg //, 689 F.2d 365, 366
(2d Cir. 1982). Although the Second Circuit held section 739(a)(ii) of the New York Family
Court Act "unconstitutional as to all juveniles," id, at 373, the court stressed that its holding
was a narrow one:
Our decision is strictly limited to the precise issue before us. We hold only that
pre-trial detention may not be imposed for anti-crime purposes pursuant to a
substantively and procedurally unlimited statutory authority when, in all like-
lihood, most detainees will either not be adjudicated guilty or will not be sen-
tenced to confinement after an adjudication of guilt. In such circumstances, the
detention period serves as punishment imposed without proof of guilt estab-
lished according to the requisite constitutional standard. We intimate no view
as to the constitutionality of preventive detention in other circumstances.
Id. at 374.
Since 1985, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 739(a)(iii) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1981) has been
renumbered N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT -I 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983). The wording of the statute
remains the same.
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.venile preventive detention comports with the fundamental fairness
required by the due process clause. The first inquiry is whether
preventive detention under the New York statute serves a legitimate
state interest. 29 The Schall Court then cited Bell v. Wolfish" and
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.'" The second inquiry is whether the
procedural safeguards in the FCA are sufficient to authorize the
pre-trial detention of at least some juveniles who are charged with
crimes." After framing this second inquiry, the Schall majority cited
Mathews v. Eldridge" and Gerstein v. Pugh."
In answering the first inquiry, the majority put forth two crucial
propositions. First, the majority concluded, based upon its own
reading of applicable precedent, that the juvenile's "undoubtedly
substantial . . . " "countervailing interest in freedom . . . " "must be
qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always
in some form of custody." 35
 For these propositions, the majority
relied upon Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services," and In re
Gault."
Second, the majority asserted that "if parental control falters,
the State must play its part as parens patriae."" "[L]n this respect,"
the majority continued, "the juvenile's liberty interest may, in ap-
propriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State's 'parens pa-
triae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the
child.'"39 After this last statement, the Court cited Santosky v. Kra-
mer.4°
In addressing its second inquiry concerning the adequacy of
procedural safeguards, the majority considered "whether the pro-
cedures afforded juveniles detained prior to factfinding provide
sufficient protection against erroneous and unnecessary depriva-
tions of' liberty."41
 The Schall Court then cited to Mathews v. Eld-
ridge. 42
 The analysis under this second inquiry included both an
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263-64 (1984).
30 441 U.S. 520, 534 n.15 (1979) (as cited by the Schall Court).
" 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (as cited by the Schall Court).
32
 Schall, 467 U.S. at 264.
" 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (as cited by the Schall Court).
34 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (as cited by the Schall Court).
" Schad, 467 U.S. at 265.
" 458 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1982) (as cited by the Schall Court).
" 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967) (as cited by the Schall Court).
33 Schall, 467 U.S. at 265.
34 Id,
40 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (as cited by the Schall Court).
4 ' Schall, 467 U.S. at 274 (footnote omitted).
42
 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (as cited by the Schall Court).
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examination of acceptable post-arrest detention under Gerstein v.
Pugh'" and also an examination of case law involving judicial pre-
dictions of dangerousness.
In its first examination, the majority listed the procedural safe-
guards provided to accused juveniles under the Family Court Act,
concluding that "[i]n sum, notice, a hearing, and a statement of
facts and reasons are given prior to any detention under
§ 320.5(3)(b). A formal probable-cause hearing is then held within
a short while thereafter, if the factfinding hearing is not itself sched-
uled within three days."'" The Schall Court went on to conclude
that these flexible procedures had been found constitutionally
adequate. under the fourth amendment and Gerstein v. Pugh,46 and
under the due process clause and Kent .v. United States. 47
In its second examination, the majority countered appellees'
claim, with which the district court agreed, that "it is virtually im-
possible to predict future criminal conduct with any degree of ac-
curacy."48 The majority noted that lolur cases indicate, however,
that from a legal point of view there is nothing inherently unattain-
able about a prediction of future criminal conduct."49 The majority
stated that "[s]uch a judgment forms an important element in many
decisions." 5°
43 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975).
44 Schall, 467 U.S. at 277.
45 Id.
46 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (as cited by the Schall Court).
47 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966) (as cited by the Schall Court).
Schall, 467 U.S. at 278.
49 Id.
" Id. at 278 (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-75 (1976); Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates,- 442 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979); and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
The majority continued:
we have specifically rejected the contention, based on the same sort of sociolog-
ical data relied upon by appellees and the District Court, "that it is impossible
to predict future behavior and that the question is so vague as to be meaning-
less."
Id. at 278-79 (citing Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274).
The majority notes as well that they "have also recognized that a prediction of future
criminal conduct is 'an experienced prediction based on a host of variables' which cannot be
readily codified." Id. at 279 (citing Greenholiz., 442 U.S. at 16). In these cases,
the decision is based on as much information as can reasonably be obtained at
the initial appearance. [citation omitted].
Given the right to a hearing, to counsel, and to a statement of reasons,
there is no reason that the specific factors upon which the Family Court judge
might rely must be specified in the statute.
Id. at 279.
The Court then considered the post-detention and review procedures which "provide a
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Section three of this essay will examine these two inquiries in
the Schall opinion, highlighting in each inquiry three crucial logical
turning points in the Court's argumentation. In each of these six
instances, the majority claimed to rely upon established judicial
precedent while it in fact created new directions in the law.
ill. THE TRANSFORMATION OF PRECEDENT IN SCHALL
Despite the ample citation creating the illusion of continuity,
the Schall opinion, in fact, operates to distort significantly settled
constitutional law. Three crucial uses of precedent in each of the
majority's two due process inquiries expose this metamorphosis of
important constitutional principles. The discussion below will track
arguments in the opinion, first providing a brief summary of the
Court's arguments.
The Schall Court framed the issue before it as whether juvenile
preventive detention pursuant to section 320.5 (3)(b) comports with
the "fundamental fairness" that due process requires. 5 ' The first
due process inquiry was whether the New York statute serves a
legitimate state interest.52 The Schall Court then cited Bell v. Wolfish"
and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 54 The Court then stated that the
juvenile's equally strong interest in being free from institutional
restraints must be qualified by acknowledging that juveniles, unlike '
adults, are always in custody." In support of this proposition, the
Schall majority cited Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services 56
and In re Gault. 57 Noting that the faltering of parental control causes
the state to have to play its part as parens patriae, the Schall Court
stated that this parens patriae interest of the state in promoting the
child's welfare may, in certain circumstances, outweigh the juvenile's
liberty interest. 58
The second due process inquiry for the Schall Court was
whether the procedures for juveniles who are detained prior to any
factfinding provide adequate protection against mistaken and un-
sufficient. mechanism For correcting, on a case-by-case basis, any erroneous detentions or-
dered under 320.5(3)." Id. at 281.
51 Schall, 467 U.S. at 263.
52
 Id. at 263-64.
" 441 U.S. 520, 534 n.15 (1979) (as cited by the Schall Court).
," 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (as cited by the Schall Court).
55 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
56 458 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1982) (as cited by the Schall Court).
55 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967) (as cited by the Schall Court).
Schall, 467 U.S. at 265.
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necessary deprivations of liberty. 59 The Court then cited Mathews v.
Eldridge" as authority. The Schall majority then cited Gerstein v.
Pugh6 ' to support the proposition that New York's Family Court
Act contained procedures that were constitutional under the fourth
amendment. 62 The Court then stated that no prior case or legal
theory would preclude a court from making a prediction about
future criminal conduct.°
A. The Formulation of the First Inquiry: The Truncation of Kennedy
The Schall majority framed its first inquiry by asking whether
preventive detention under the New York statute serves a legitimate
state objective. The majority implied that this "legitimate state ob-
jective" standard was derived from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.
The majority, however, misrepresented that precedent by such an
implication.
The Schall Court performed its transformation of Kennedy in
two stages. First, it relied on Bell's previous truncation of Kennedy
in framing its first inquiry. Then, it further truncated Kennedy by
collapsing Bell's three criteria into two.
1. Bell's Truncation of the Kennedy Criteria
The majority relied on the Court's prior opinions in Bell v.
Wolfish64 and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 65 in formulating the first
inquiry. In Bell, criminal defendants, who acknowledged that they
were legitimately detained after arraignment to ensure their pres-
ence at trial, challenged the conditions of their detention. In con-
sidering the detainee's challenge to crowding in cells, restrictions
on mail and packages, and searches of cells and anal and genital
body cavities, the Bell opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, focused
on whether the practices constituted "punishment in the constitu-
tional sense:"66
Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the
part of detention facility officials, that determination gen-
5" /d. at 274.
6° 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (as cited by the Schall Court).
6
 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (as cited by the Schall Court).
62 Schall, 467 U.S. at 277.
63 Id. at 278.
" 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
65 372 U.S. 144 (1963),
6' Bell, 441 U.S. at 561.
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erally will turn on 'whether an alternative purpose to
which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is as-
signable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].'" 7
The majority pulled the latter part of the quoted sentence from
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez." In this analysis, Bell misrepresented
the standards enunciated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez for deter-
mining whether challenged government sanctions are punitive or
regulatory.
In Kennedy, two former American citizens challenged the con-
stitutionality of acts of Congress that divested Americans of their
citizenship because of their absence from the United States during
wartime or national emergency in order to avoid training and ser-
vice in the United States armed forces. In order to determine
whether the federal legislation was penal or regulatory in character,
the Kennedy Court enunciated a test that required, first, a review of
legislative history to search for explicit punitive intent, and then, if
no overt penal motive was found, an evaluation of the statute in
light of seven criteria. The Kennedy Court derived these seven tests
from earlier Supreme Court opinions. The tests, in the Kennedy
Court's own words, are:
[I] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability
or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded
as a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote
the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and de-
terrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applied is
already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned.""
In the same sentence, the Court in Kennedy continued that "all"
factors are "relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in differing
directions.""
Thus Kennedy, properly read, requires a court first to examine
the statutory intent for punitive motives, and if it finds none, then
to apply all seven tests to determine if the statute is penal or regu-
" 7 1d. at 538.
"" 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1063) (as cited by the Schall Court).
"" Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (numbering added; seven footnotes omitted).
7" Id. at 169 (emphasis added).
652	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 31:641
latory. Although the Kennedy Court concluded that punitive legis-
lative intent was manifest in the act of Congress there at issue,
Kennedy nevertheless stressed that in cases where congressional in-
tent is unclear, the seven factors "must be considered in relation to
the statute on its face." 71
The Bell Court relied upon Kennedy for the proposition that,
where legislative intent is unclear, determination of a practice's
penal character will turn on whether a non-punitive alternative
purpose can be assigned to the restriction and whether the practice
appears excessive in relation to that non-punitive purpose. By so
relying on Kennedy, the Bell Court effectively amputated the first
five Kennedy criteria. 72 The Bell Court never evaluated the chal-
lenged conditions of detention in light of five of the seven required
Kennedy factors. 73
Similarly, the Scholl opinion, which cited both Kennedy and Bell,
never evaluated the New York preventive detention statute in light
of the first five Kennedy factors. Scholl did not even acknowledge the
existence of those five factors. Instead, Schall cited Kennedy as the
source of its "legitimate state objective" standard. 74 This truncation
of Kennedy allowed the Schall Court to grapple only with the question
of express punitive intent, and then, if no overt penal motives were
present, only with the last two Kennedy factors, the only ones relating
to the notion of a legitimate state objective. Significantly, the word
"legitimate" never appeared in the Kennedy criteria. 75
All seven factors, as applied to the sanction of detention of a
juvenile in a locked facility prior to a probable cause hearing, indeed
"point in differing directions," as Kennedy anticipated. 76 Scholl, how-
ever, did not acknowledge these differing directions. Had all seven
71 Id. (emphasis added).
72 See Bell, 441 .
 U.S. at 538.
73
 It is even more troubling that Kennedy was never an appropriate precedent for Bell,
because Bell appropriated Kennedy's tests for acts of Congress and applied them to regulations
promulgated by state administrators. The Court in Bell thus transformed the standards for
review of legislative decisions to the administrative realm, without justifying according equal
deference to Congressional and Executive regulations. Justice Marshall protested this trans-
formation in his Bell dissent. Bell, 441 U.S. at 565 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Kennedy did apply inure closely to Schall, which involved a state statute. 1-lad Schall relied
directly upon Kennedy, instead of upon Kennedy truncated by Bell, all seven factors should
have been considered.
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263-64 (1984).
75 See infra note 97 for a further discussion of the absence of the word legitimate" in
the Kennedy opinion.
a Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963).
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factors been considered in the Schall opinion," the following anal-
ysis might have ensued:
Factor one: Because secure detention involves a locked fa-
cility in which a child's freedom of movement is restricted
physically, New York preventive detention is a penal sanc-
tion.
Factor two: Because incarceration in a locked facility in
which freedom of movement is restricted has historically
been regarded as a punishment, New York preventive
detention is a penal sanction.
Factor three: Preventive detention is imposed upon certain
arrested juveniles, based upon the judge's projection of
the individual child's future state of mind and particular
behavior. It is not imposed upon all arrested juveniles on
a general, indiscriminate basis. Therefore, it is a penal
sanction. 78
Factor four: Because the operation of detention will pro-
mote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and
deterrence—it is a penal sanction."
Factor five: Because the behavior for which preventive de-
tention is imposed is future crime that the judge predicts
the child may commit, by definition this future behavior
is "already a crime." Therefore, preventive detention is a
penal sanction."
" The district court prefaced its consideration of whether preventive detention consti-
tuted punishment with a recitation of all seven Kennedy factors. Strasburg 1, 513 F. Supp. 691,
716 (S.O.N.Y. 1981).
" Kennedy cited two cases to support factor three. The Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S.
20, 37-38 (1921), distinguished between a tax and a penalty, holding that scienter is associated
with penalties, riot taxes. In this case, an employer was required to pay a premium only if
he knew that the child he employed was under the specified age limit. Payment depended
upon the employer's knowledge; therefore, because of this scienter requirement, the payment
was held to be a penalty rather than a tax. Heiwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 610-12
(1902), similarly distinguished between a revenue-directed importation duty and a penalty,
holding that the payment was a penalty because it was imposed not upon the importation of
goods, in general, but rather upon the individual importer, in response to his or her particular
behavior, i.e., his or her undervaluation of the goods.
79 One commentator suggests that under this factor, the FCA is penal because "after
eventually being adjudicated delinquent, many juveniles are not sentenced to further incar-
ceration because the pretrial detention period is 'considered sufficient punishment by the
Family Court. — Comment, The Supreme Court and Pretrial Detention of Juveniles: A Principled
Solution to a Due Process Dilemma, 132 U. PA. L. REV, 95, 109 (1983).
8° Kennedy cited three cases to support factor five. All three cases, in the context of selling
liquor in violation of Prohibition, distinguished a tax from a penalty, holding that payment
constitutes a penalty .if it relates to behavior already deemed to be a crime. United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572-73
(1931); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922).
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Factor six: Because an alternative purpose, like crime pre-
vention, to which pre-trial detention may rationally be con-
nected can be assigned and the standard for the connec-
tion is very low, it is a regulatory sanction.
Factor seven: Because incarceration of juveniles based on
a low accuracy predictive showing will tend to incarcerate
far more juveniles than those who actually would commit
acts amounting to a crime before the adjournment date,
the sanction is excessive in relation to the alternative pur-
pose, and it is a penal sanction.
The full application of all seven Kennedy factors reveals that six out
of seven tend to condemn New York's preventive detention scheme
as a penal sanction.'"
2. Schall's Further Truncation of the Bell Criteria
When the Schall Court actually applied its truncated Kennedy
analysis, the majority did not explicitly explain each step of its
analysis. 82 In fact, Schall further transformed the Kennedy criteria,
beyond Bell, by misapplying each of the Bell factors. The following
analysis examines the Schall Court's application of Bell's three Ken-
nedy criteria: explicit punitive intent, alternative assignable purpose,
and non-excessiveness of restriction relative to purpose. Because
Schall considered the alternate assignable purpose first, and col-
lapsed the other two, we will consider them in that order.
a. Alternative Assignable Purpose
The Schall majority argues that preventive detention in New
York "is purportedly designed to protect the child and society from
the potential consequences of his criminal acts." 88 Shortly thereafter,
Hi For another assessment of the FCA against the Kennedy "laundry list," see Comment,
The Supreme Court and Pretrial Detention of Juveniles: A Principled Solution to a Due Process
Dilemma, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 95, 108-09, 111 (1983). This commentator, however, does not
include factors three and five in the analysis. See id. at 109. This commentator also concludes
that the Kennedy analysis results in a finding that juvenile preventive detention is punitive.
See id. at 111.
"2 See generally Schall, 467 U.S. at 269-74.
" Id. at 264. The majority finds this purpose in the 1976 New York Court of Appeals
People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 690, 350 N.E.2d 906, 910 (1976), holding
that the New York preventive detention provision does not violate the equal protection or
due process provisions of the Federal or New York State Constitutions. On the pages noted
in Schall, the Schupf court notes flatly that laInalytically, the compelling State interest is to
prevent the commission of further criminal acts." Schupf, 350 N.E.2d at 910, 39 N.Y.2d at
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the majority relied upon In re Gault to support the importance of
the state objective of crime prevention.
In conjunction with this discussion, the Schall majority cited
Gault twice in quick succession. The first citation appeared after the
majority's statement that the "weighty"" social objective of crime
prevention "persists undiluted in the juvenile context" and referred
690. Basing its decision on "significant, even compelling, differences between children and
adults," id. at 909, the Schupf court noted that
[t]his statute reflects the merger of two fundamental concerns of the State—to
protect the community prospectively from the perpetration of serious crimes
and to protect and shelter children who in consequence of grave antisocial
behavior are demonstrably in need of special treatment and care . . . The
statute omits to specify whether, on the basis of such a predicate finding, detention
may be ordered for the protection of the public or for the benefit of the juvenile
or both . .
Id. at 908 (emphasis added).
Thus, contrary to the majority's reading of the statute, only Schupf, not the statute on
its face, discusses protection of the juvenile. Nor does the Court of Appeals discuss any
legislative history revealing such a motivation. Despite the lack of legislative intent or express
language in section 320.5(3)(b) of the N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT supporting this formulation of the
purpose of preventive detention, the Schall majority takes this purpose as the starting point
for its first inquiry.
The Schall majority continued by noting that the delinquency statute directs the Family
Court judge to consider the "needs and best interests of the juvenile as well as the need for
the protection of the community." Scholl, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (citing N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1
(McKinney 1983)). The majority did not reflect on the absence of discussion in the statute
of detention for the protection of the child; neither did the majority consider the child's
protection in the context of other "needs and best interests" of the child, for instance, the
importance of remaining in his home, pursuing an uninterrupted education, or being spared
the experience in a juvenile detention center such as Spofford. Rather, the majority sum-
marily concluded that
[a]s an initial matter, therefore, we must decide whether, in the context of the
juvenile system, the combined interest in protecting both the community and the
juvenile himself from the consequences of future criminal conduct is sufficient.
to justify such detention.
Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
" Id. The Scholl Court stated that the Court had "stressed before that crime prevention
is a `weighty social objective. – Id. (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979)). Brown does
use that language in the fourth amendment context to describe a Texas "stop and frisk"
statute, but determined in the sentence earlier that:
pin the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the balance
between the public interest and appellant's right to personal security and privacy
tilts in favor of freedom from police interference.
Brown, 443 U.S. at 52. By lifting "weighty" from this inappropriate context, the majority
could then measure the "weighty" governmental interest against the juvenile's "qualified"
liberty interest. See infra notes 115-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Schall
Court's analysis of the juvenile's interest in liberty. Because the Scholl Court relieved itself of
the duty to explore the risk of error in governmental procedures, see infra notes 141-201
and accompanying text for a discussion of these governmental procedures, the use of the
word "weighty" here succeeded in tipping the due process balance in favor of preventive
detention.
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to Gault's statistics on juvenile proceedings in 1965, nineteen years
before Schal1. 85 The second citation followed Schall's proposition
that "the harm to society generally may even be greater in this
context given the high rate of recidivism among juveniles."" This
passage referred to Gault's recidivism rates from the calendar year
1965 and the fiscal year 1966. The Schall majority's liberal citation
of Gault created the overall impression that Schall stood in unity
with Gault. Scrutiny of these citations reveals, however, that the
majority cited Gault for its most irrelevant aspect: its outdated sta-
tistics."
In fact, Gault stands neither for the proposition that the state's
crime prevention objective continues undiluted in the juvenile con-
text, nor for the earlier suggestion that the juvenile's interest and
the community's interests must be jointly protected. Reversing the
Arizona Supreme Court's affirmance of the state court dismissal of
a writ of habeas corpus sought by the parents of a fifteen year old
boy committed to a state industrial school after an informal juvenile
court procedure, the Court in Gault held that juveniles facing de-
linquency charges enjoy the right to notice of the charges, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and the rights to confront and
cross-examine witnesses pursuant to their rights under the due
process clause of the federal Constitution." The court in Gault
concluded flatly that "[a] proceeding where the issue is whether the
child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of
his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prose-
cution.""
The unity of interest between the society and the juvenile sug-
gested by the majority early in the Schall opinion contrasts dramat-
ically with the vision of state-child relations set forth in Gault. The
Gault opinion depicts a hostile and overreaching state that deprives
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 n.26
(1967)).
" Id. at 265 (citing Garth, 387 U.S. at 22),
" Between these two successive citations of Gault, the Schall Court in footnote 14 dis-
cussed Federal statistics noting that juveniles under 16 accounted for 17.3% of all arrests for
violent and serious property crimes, and 7.5% of all arrests for violent crimes in 1982. The Court
does not discuss recent recidivism rates, nor rates of crimes committed by juveniles released
pending trial on criminal charges. Interestingly enough, the 1982 statistics appear on the
surface to represent an improvement over Gaun's 1965 statistics (showing persons under 18
accounting for about 20% of all arrests for serious crimes and over 50% of serious property
crimes).
" See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967).
89 Id.
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the child and his or her parents of the time needed to prepare the
child's defense against restrictive state sanctions and that may well
have overpowered the child's will to defend himself against state
accusations."
Justice Fortas, writing for the Court in Gault, incorporated into
his opinion the strong language of the Court in Haley v. Ohio, 9 t in
which the Court excluded a fifteen-year-old boy's confession to
murder after a night-long police interrogation because he was
deemed "an easy victim of the law," a "ready victim of the inquisi-
tion," no match for the police in such a "contest."92 The Haley Court,
cited by Fortas, noted that during the nighttime questioning, the
child "needs someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering pres-
ence of the law, as he knows it, crush him."`''
The Gault Court itself noted that one of the purposes of the
fifth amendment is to prevent the state, "whether by force or by
psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of
the person under investigation."" All this imagery and rhetoric 95
conveyed the Gault Court's profound distrust for the state and the
Court's resolve to protect the individual from state overreaching.
Rather than a strong identification between the state and the child,
the imagery from Gault and Haley portrays the state and child
radically at odds, with the parents defending the child from state
domination. Far from a state protecting a wayward child from
himself or the dangers of crime, Gault depicts the boy's parents as
protecting their son from state overreaching and domination.
Because Gault is strongly oriented toward the protection of
juvenile rights, it is absurd that the Schall majority cited its irrelevant
statistics to support the importance of crime prevention as the pur-
pose of the juvenile detention statute. The majority misrepresented
Gault for the first time 96 in pursuing its truncated Kennedy analysis.°
9 See infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship of
Schall to parents' rights jurisprudence.
9 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
9a Gault, 387 U.S. at 45-46 (citing Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596,599-600 (1948)).
93 Id. at 46 (citing Haley, 332 U.S. at 599-600).
Id. at 47.
9$ For more on imagery as the core of rhetoric and legal argument, sec R. Parker,
Political Vision in Constitutional Argument (Feb. 1979) (unpublished manuscript on file in
Harvard Law School Library).
9 See infra notes 115-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the second misre-
presentation.
97 In continuing its analysis of the "legitimacy" of the state objective, the Schall majority
supports its proposition that the state interests presumably underlying New York's preventive
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b. Explicit Punitive Intent
The Schall Court combined its examination of whether New
York's FCA contained explicit punitive intent with its consideration
of the seventh Kennedy/third Bell factor, "whether [the restriction]
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to
it]."98
 The Court examined the language of the statute alone, but,
detention statute are legitimate by collecting the rulings of eight state courts mentioning
protection of the juvenile and fifty state statutes and the District of Columbia statute, all
allowing preventive detention. The majority concludes:
[i]n light of the uniform legislative judgment that pretrial detention of juveniles
properly promotes the interests both of society and the juvenile, we conclude
that the practice serves a legitimate regulatory purpose compatible with the
"fundamental fairness" demanded by the Due Process Clause in juvenile pro-
ceedings.
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 (1984) (footnote omitted) (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 548 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
This conclusion is doubly unjustified. First, even if we accept that the prevalent practice
is per se legitimate, the Court does riot demonstrate that the fifty state legislatures instituted
preventive detention to protect both society and the juvenile. To the contrary, a survey of
the fifty states demonstrates that only eighteen expressly authorize preventive detention both
"when it is in the juveniles 'best interest' or when it is necessary to protect the juvenile .
[and] when it is necessary for the protection of the community and general public." Have
They Held Your Child Today?, supra note 12, at 320. See also id. at 320-21 nn. 49-50.
As we have seen above, New York is in fact not among those eighteen states. See supra
note 83 for a discussion of the argument that the New York statute is not explicitly aimed at
the protection of the juvenile. Of the eight state high courts mentioned, three were among
the eighteen states whose statutes expressly stated the double protection purpose. L.O.W. v.
District Court of Arapahoe, 623 P.2d 1253 (Colo. 1981) (compare Cow. REV. STAT. § 19—
2-103(3)(a)(I) (Supp. 1985)); Pauley v. Gross, I Kan. App. 2d 736 (1977) (compare KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-815b(c)(1) (1981)); and Baker v. Smith, 488 S.W.2d (Ky. App. 1971)
(compare KT. REV. STAT. ANN. 208.192(4)(c) (Michie/13obbs-Merrill) (1982)). New York was
included in the five remaining.
Even if we credit the New York Court of Appeals' unsubstantiated declaration of state
purpose in Schupf, see supra note 83 for a discussion of Schupf, no more than twenty-three
of fifty-one jurisdictions using juvenile preventive detention do so for the dual purpose of
community and juvenile protection. Thus, the fact that fifty states have sonic kind of pre-
ventive detention or another hardly justifies the conclusion that New York's preventive
detention is part of a "practice serv[ing] a legitimate regulatory purpose." Scholl, 467 U.S. at
268. In fact, even if there is a majority practice, New York is among a minority of states who
pursue this particular dual purpose. For more on the differences among the fifty preventive
detention statutes, see Have They Held Your Child Today?, supra note 12, at 319-22.
Second, the Court offered no reason why legitimacy should be based upon prevalence
among the states in the first place. This suggested that "legitimate" means "widely shared,"
implying a judgment solely about the prevalence of the practice as opposed to its substantive
content. This definition is never explicitly justified.
Because the word "legitimate" never appeared in Kennedy, this nose-counting definition
of "legitimate" is yet another innovation of Scholl.
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984) (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 169 (1963)).
March 19901 TRANSFORMATION OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT	 659
in so doing, ultimately failed to apply the explicit punitive intent
test in a manner consistent with Kennedy.
The Kennedy Court had struck down the statute upon a finding
of a specific punitive intent, even though the statutory language was
not found to be explicitly punitive. Rather, the Kennedy Court had
based its holding on an examination of legislative history that re-
vealed not only a predecessor statute that had called the measure a
"penalty," but also legislative memoranda and floor debates replete
with punitive language, and no suggestion of an alternative govern-
mental purpose. 99 By contrast, the Schall majority scrutinized only
the statutory language for explicit punitive intent, making no ref-
erence to legislative history. Clearly, the Schall Court narrowed this
examination of intent required by the Kennedy Court. After Schall,
Kennedy's explicit punitive intent standard appears to stand for mere
inspection of the statute itself for penal legislative motive.
c. Excessiveness of Restriction Relative to Alternative Purpose
The Scholl majority also stayed within the four corners of the
statute to evaluate New York's preventive detention scheme in light
of the third Bell factor: whether the restriction exceeds the require-
ments of the alternative purpose assigned to it. The majority
pointed out that, first, the detention is "strictly limited in time," 10°
and, second, that the conditions of confinement "also appear to
reflect the regulatory purposes relied upon by the State." 1 ° 1
With respect to the first observation, the Scholl majority noted
that the juvenile is entitled to a probable-cause hearing within three
days of the conclusion of the initial appearance, after which deten-
tion may only be continued upon an additional finding of necessity.
The juvenile also is entitled to an expedited fact-finding hearing
within three to fourteen days, depending on the seriousness of the
alleged acts amounting to a crime. Because the "maximum possible
detention" is six to seventeen days,'" 2 the majority concluded that
See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 170-84.
"'" Schall, 467 U.S. at 269.
to , Id. at 270.
11)2 Id. The majority erred in calculating the maximum possible pretrial detention. Sec-
tion 307,3 of the N.Y. Family Court Act allows a child to be held for up to seventy-two hours
(for instance, over a long holiday weekend), if arrested while on a non-working day. In
addition, section 307.4(4)(c) of the FCA allows a Family Court judge to hold a child in the
absence of a petition based upon a section 320.5(3)(b) finding; a petition need be filed and
probable cause hearing held within four days. N.Y. FAM. Act' 307.4(7) (McKinney
1983). Thus, a child could be held up to seven days without the filing of a petition and
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"[t]hese time frames seem suited to the limited purpose of providing
the youth with a controlled environment and separating him from
improper influences pending the speedy disposition of his case."I°3
The Schall opinion's rhetoric evokes the images of a kindly,
concerned parental state providing a safe haven for the wayward
child while, at the same time, conscientiously restraining its inter-
vention ("limited purpose") and pursuing the child's procedural
rights ("speedy disposition of his case"). 11)4 This imagery flowed
straight from the idea of the state as the benign custodian who steps
in to protect the child "if parental control falters."'m The majority
inferred that such benign, protective legislation is neither explicitly
punitive nor excessive given its dual protective purpose.
The Schall majority's remarkable depiction continues as it dis-
cusses, second, the "conditions of confinement [that] also appear to
reflect the regulatory purposes relied upon by the State." 106 In so
doing, however, the majority failed to follow the mandates of Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 52, which provides that a district court's
Iflindings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the cred-
ibility of the witnesses."t° 7 The Schall majority completely disre-
garded the district court's findings of fact in Strasburg I. The district
court found that the juveniles detained pre-trial at facilities like
Spofford often undergo strip-searches, wear institutional clothing,
without probable cause to believe he or she committed the offense charged, and up to twenty-
one clays altogether. For a discussion of the constitutional limits on detention before probable
cause is shown, and &halts consideration of them, see infra notes 151-70 and accompanying
text.
"3 Scholl, 467 U.S. at 270.
I " My own experience with juvenile detention personnel in the Manhattan Family Court
between 1983 and 1986 has shown me that there are exceptionally kind, warm and caring
professionals employed in the juvenile detention system in New York. Nevertheless, the
overall experience of children I represented in secure detention accords more closely with
the district court's findings about the inadequacy of Spofford Juvenile Center and Gault's
general claims about juvenile incarceration. See infra notes 115-29 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Gault.
1 "5 Schall, 467 U.S. at 265. For discussion of how Supreme Court jurisprudence, epito-
mized by Gault, has consistently rejected this imagery, see infra notes 115-29 and accom-
panying text.
"" Scholl, 467 U.S. at 270.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Note that when Schall was decided, the phrase "whether based
on oral or documentary evidence" was not part of the language of the rule. FED. R. Civ. P.
52(a) advisory committee's notes, 1985 Amendment. See also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273 (1982).
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and mingle with adjudicated juvenile delinquents awaiting place-
ment.'"
The Scholl Court never suggested that these findings were
clearly erroneous. Instead, the Court relied upon testimony about
Spofford from the trial record even though it had not been adopted
by the trier of fact, whose "opportunity . to judge of the credibility
of the witnesses" the Rule requires to be given "due regard."'"
The Scholl majority wrote that a juvenile "cannot, absent ex-
ceptional circumstances, be sent to a prison or lockup where he
would be exposed to adult criminals,""° and thus the state continues
to "protect" him during this pre-trial phase. The majority stated
that even Spofford Juvenile Center's secure detention was "still
consistent with the regulatory and wrens patriae objectives relied
upon by the state."'"
Children are assigned to separate dorms based on age,
size, and behavior. They wear street clothes provided by
the institution and partake in educational and recreational
programs and counseling sessions run by trained social
workers. Misbehavior is punished by confinement to one's
room [citation omitted]. We cannot conclude from this
record that the controlled environment briefly imposed
by the State on juveniles in secure pre-trial detention "is
imposed for the purpose of punishment" rather than as
"an incident of some other legitimate governmental pur-
pose."" 2
The Scholl majority failed to state its reasons for crediting this
testimony over the testimony of a former New York City Deputy
Mayor for Criminal justice, that "Spofford [Juvenile Detention Cen-
ter] is, in many ways, indistinguishable from a prison." The Scholl
Strasburg 1, 513 F. Stipp. 691, 695 n.5 (1981). Trial testimony by a family court judge
further revealed his belief that by putting a child in detention, "you are liable to he exposing
these youngsters to all sorts of things" including assault and sexual assault. Scholl, 467 U.S.
at 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
I", FED. R. Civ. P. 52 (a).
"" Sella!! v. Martin, 467 U.S. 263, 270 (1984).
in Id. at 271.
" 2 Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)). Mr. Kelly, then Deputy Com-
missioner of Operations, New York City Department of Juvenile Justice, testified at the
district court. The district court did not adopt this testimony as a finding of fact.
"3 Scholl, 467 U.S. at 290 n.13 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Even accepting the Court's
depiction of Spofford as realistic, its theory of children's welfare does not withstand scrutiny.
Commentators have discussed the "social and psychological negative impacts" of pretrial
detention. Who is Preventive Detention Proteeling?, supra note 12, at 360. One commentator,
reviewing both legal and social science literature on the effects of detention, notes the ill
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majority's analysis of the excessive nature of the restriction in re-
lation to its alternative purpose thus favored isolated testimony
drawn from the appellate record and disregarded the district court
findings to which the Supreme Court is required to give deference.
The majority's description of New York's secure detention fa-
cility focused on the timing and conditions of detention in deter-
mining that the restriction was not excessive. Focusing on the con-
ditions of detention was appropriate in Bell, where those conditions,
and not detention itself, were challenged. In Schall, however, the
detention, not the conditions of detention, was at issue.
Thus, the Schall majority's discussion of detention was doubly
inadequate. The majority first minimized the fact that the detention
is locked and involuntary. It then focused on a misrepresentation
of the district court's findings as to the conditions in detention as
they actually exist. 14
In effect, the Schall majority further distorted the Bell criteria,
which in fact were a distortion of the Kennedy criteria. The Schall
majority examined the detention, in considering its excessiveness in
relation to its alternative purpose, for the wrong characteristics: its
timing and conditions rather than its restrictive, involuntary nature.
Furthermore, in examining the Schall detention conditions, the ma-
jority misrepresented the findings of fact of the lower court. The
Kennedy criteria were first truncated, and then improperly applied.
Thus, Schall has worked a remarkable transformation on Kennedy's
substantive due process analysis.
B. The Primacy of Custody Over Liberty: The Misrepresentation of
Lehman and Gault
The Supreme Court in Schall further transformed precedent
in its discussion of the liberty interests of juveniles. The Schall
majority asserted that "the juvenile's . . . interest in freedom,"" 5 in
effects of detention on a youngster's self-image, her learning independence, her outside
responsibilities and opportunities, her morale, preparation of her legal case, her outlook
upon society and the law, the probability of her recidivism, and her sophistication in crime.
Id. at 360-64 [citations omitted]. Thus, both the binding district court Findings concerning
the reality of Spofford's detention and scholarly literature on detention demonstrate the
extent to which the majority's depiction of preventive detention betrays rather than safe-
guards the "welfare of the child."
"'See infra notes 151-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fact that the
timing of the detention is much more problematic, in light of Gerstein, than the Schall majority
admitted.
n' Schall, 467 U.S. at 265.
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support of which the Court properly cited Gault, "must be qualified
by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some
form of custody."" 8 For this later proposition, the majority relied
upon Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services and Gault.' 17
These cases do not support the proposition for which they are cited.
In Lehman, a biological mother, whose parental rights to her
three sons had been legally terminated, invoked title 28, section
2254 of the United States Code, a federal habeas corpus statute, on
behalf of the three boys, in an attempt to regain her custody and
guardianship rights. The Lehman Court there addressed the issue
of
whether federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, under [28
U.S.C.] § 2254, may be invoked to challenge the consti-
tutionality of a state statute under which a State has ob-
tained custody of children and has terminated involuntar-
ily the parental rights of their natural parent." 8
The six-justice majority concluded that, as a jurisdictional matter,
the children were not "in custody" within the meaning of the federal
habeas corpus statute. The Lehman Court stressed that the boys
were in the custody of their foster parents "in essentially the same
way, and to the same extent, other children are in the custody of
their natural or adoptive parents."" 9
The Court in Lehman was careful to note that the children
involved were not in the custody of a state institution or in the
criminal justice system. 12" The Lehman boys' "situation in this re-
spect differs little from the situation of other children in the public
generally; they suffer no unusual restraints not imposed on other
children." 12 ' The Lehman Court specifically declined to comment on
the availability of federal habeas corpus when a child is "actually
confined in a state institution rather than being at liberty in the
custody of a foster parent pursuant to court order." 22
 Because the
1 [6 Id.
' 17 Id, (citing Lehman v. Lycoming Children's Servs., 458 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1982); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967)).
118 Lehman, 458 U.S. at 507.
119 Id. at 510.
720
 "Her sons, of course, are nor prisoners. Nor do they suffer any restrictions imposed
by a state criminal justice system. These factors alone distinguish this case from all other
cases in which this Court has sustained habeas challenges to state-court judgments." Lehman,
458 U.S. at 510.
IP' Id at 510-11.
102 Id, at 511 n.12.
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Lehman Court explicitly addressed the construction of the term
"custody" solely in the context of the federal habeas statute, and
because it overtly declined to comment on children's confinement
to state institutions, it is wholly inapposite in the context cited by
Schall.
As a second authority for the proposition that juveniles enjoy
a lesser liberty interest than adults, the Schall majority cited Gault.' 23
,While Gault does contain the language quoted in Schall, Gault used
it in order to criticize that same language later in the opinion. The
quotation appeared in a section of the Gault opinion describing the
fact that "the highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to
a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any com-
parable context." 24 The results have "not been entirely satisfac-
tory." 125 The Gault Court noted there that the "right of the state, as
parens patriae, to deny to the child procedural rights available to his
elders was elaborated by the assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has
a right 'not to liberty but to custody. "''46
The Gault Court did not embrace the Schutt conclusion that
juveniles have a lesser, qualified right to liberty because they are
always in custody. To the contrary, Justice Fortas in Gault reiterated
that, for the purposes of his discussion of the privilege against self-
incrimination, "at least," that "commitment [to a juvenile facility] is
a deprivation of liberty." 127
The Gault majority strongly distinguished between the custody
of the state and the custody of parents:
It is of no constitutional consequence—and of limited
practical meaning—that the institution to which he is com-
mitted is called an Industrial School. The fact of the mat-
ter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "receiving
home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an insti-
tution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated
for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes "a building
with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institu-
tional hours . . ." Instead of mother and father and
sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world
is pe6pled by guards, custodians, state employees, and
12] Schall, 467 U.S. at 265 (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 17).
124 /n re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 17 (1967).
125 /d. at 18.
126 Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
127 Id. at 50.
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"delinquents" confined with him for anything from way-
wardness [footnote omitted] to rape and homicide.'"
The majority in Schall ignored this distinction, contending that
preventive detention is merely a custody TRANSFER of the child
between the family and the state, in which the one who transfers and
the one who receives custody makes no essential difference to the
child. The Court in Gault, however, depicted the delinquency pro-
ceeding as essentially a custody BATTLE for the child between the family
and the state, where the one who wins and the one who loses makes
a tremendous difference to the child.'"
The Lehman Court, in construing the federal habeas statute,
denied that the foster children involved were in state custody at all.
The Gault Court portrayed custody by parents and custody by the
state as vastly different, antagonistic situations and used the lan-
guage later cited by the Schall Court for the purpose of refuting it.
Thus, the two cases, cited as precedent in Schall, simply do not stand
for Schall's proposition that a juvenile's liberty interest must be
qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always
in some form of custody. The Schall majority, in fact, betrayed
precedent by formulating such a significant restriction on juvenile
rights.
128
 Gault, 387 U.S. at 27.
129 Experts on child development and custody have concluded that the question of the
child's best interests turns not on the fact of custody, but rather the fact of whose custody the
child enjoys. The noted interdisciplinary team of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert
Solnit, authors of the trilogy considering the appropriate criteria for state intervention into
the family, insist that those who care about children must care more about the quality of the
child's relationship with the custodian than the mere existence of custody. Their studies have
struggled carefully with the issue of when "parental control" can be deemed to have "faltered"
sufficiently that it is both just and best for the child that the parent's custody should be
supplanted. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973); J.GOLDSTErN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979).
Whereas the majority would opine that the mere transfer of the custody of the child
would not harm the "welfare of the child" nor the child's right to custody, Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit would stress the necessary continuity of the relationship between the child and his
long-term caretaker, a crucial component to the child's healthy development. For instance,
Goldstein, Freud, and Solidi's criteria suggest that the identity of the person who does all
this assigning, punishing, giving out street clothes, teaching, playing, and counseling, matters
much more than the mere fact that it is done. When a parent punishes a child by sending
him to his room, it is qualitatively different from an anonymous counselor's exerting the
same authority. Even if a counselor at Spofford could develop a lasting, healthy relationship
with a child, Goldstein, Freud, Solnit and Goldstein would caution against a professional and
a specialist attempting to play the generalized role in a child's life that only a parent can
play. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, A. SOLN1T & S. GOLDSTEIN, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1986),
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C. The State's Parens Patriae Duty if Parental Control Falters: The
Subversion of Santosky
In its third major distortion in the first due process inquiry,
Schall created the illusion that Santosky v. Kramerm supports a prop-
osition that instead it contradicts. The Schall majority asserted that:
['l]t' parental control falters, the State must play its part as
parens patriae . . . . In this respect, the juvenile's liberty
interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be subordi-
nated to the State's `parens patriae interest in preserving
and promoting the welfare of the child."'
While Santosky was indeed the source of the phrase "parens
patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the
child," Santosky does not support Schall's proposition that the juve-
nile's liberty interest must be subordinated to the state's interest in
his welfare. In Santosky, the Court invalidated the civil standard of
proof in the New York termination of parental rights statute, hold-
ing that due process requires proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence of parental unfitness before a state may terminate parental
rights. In the same paragraph referred to above, the Santosky Court
noted that:
while there is still reason to believe that a positive, nur-
turing parent-child relationship exists, the parens patriae
interest favors preservation, not severance of natural fa-
milial bonds. . . . ITJhe State registers no gain towards its
declared goals when it separates children from the custody
of fit parents." 2
Despite Santosky's strong emphasis on preservation of the family and
avoidance of state intervention, Schall cited Santosky to support its
claim that even allegations that one's child had committed a minor
crime could be held to constitute a "faltering" of "parental control"
justifying his separation from his parents and his "transfer to the
custody" of the state.
Moreover, Santosky recognized that natural parents have a "fun-
damental liberty interest" in the "care, custody, and management
of their child."'" In finding the statutory "preponderance of the
evidence standard" too low to satisfy the resultant due process
"u 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
j " Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766).
ass Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766-67 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972)).
133 1d. at 753.
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requirements, the Santosky Court relied heavily on cases following
In re Winship. 134
 The Santosky Court focused on the post-Winship
requirement of a higher level of scrutiny, "necessary to preserve
fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceed-
ings that threaten the individual involved with 'a significant depri-
vation of liberty' or 4 stigma." 35
Thus, both of the propositions for which Santosky stands con-
tradict crucial assumptions underlying Schall. First, Santosky raised
the parental custody interest to a constitutional level, making trans-
fer of the child from parental custody to the custody of the state a
significant, constitutionally protected event. 136 Santosky suggested
that mere "falter[ing]" of "parental control," which is all that Schall
requires for state exercise of parens patriae, 137
 would be an insuffi-
cient basis for the state's disruption of the family.'"
Second, Santosky's reverence for the role of standard of proof
in assigning risk of factual error among the parties requires that,
even if "faltering of parental control" grounds is accepted as suffi-
cient grounds for intervention, the state must still prove "faltering
of parental control" with greater evidence than the mere arrest of
their child. For instance, a juvenile, living in an intact home with
two responsible parents, might still be arrested. Can the majority
definitively conclude that parental control is necessarily "faltering"
simply because a police officer feels justified in arresting a child for
any crime in New York?' 39
154
 397 U.S. 358 (1970); cases relied upon by the Court include Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418 (1979) (civil commitment); Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S.
276 (1966) (deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) (denaturalization);
and Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (denaturalization).
"5 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 425, 426).
Gault also includes the parents as beneficiaries of notice of rights implicated in the
criminal prosecution of their child and thus supports this deference to the parents' interest.
See, e.g., In re Gault, '387 U.S. 1,41 (1967) ("We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency
which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed,
the child and his parents must he notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel
. . . ." (emphasis added)). Sea also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREuu & A. Sou,Nrr, BEFORE THE BEST
INTERESTS ov THE Clow 128-29 (1979). See supra notes 115-29 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Gault's disdain for the parens patriae rationale.
I " Schall, 467 U.S. at 265.
"" By contrast, for example, in New York, the only other grounds for removal of the
child from the parents against their will are "abuse or neglect" of the child, grounds signif-
icantly more serious than "faltering." See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 1022(a)(ii) (McKinney
1983).
' 5" See infra notes 151-69 for a discussion of the point that detention is ordered even
absent a showing of probable cause that the juvenile committed the acts charged.
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In sum, the majority's conclusion that the juvenile's liberty
interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the
state's parens palriae interest and the majority's application of this
conclusion to the context of pre-trial juvenile detention clearly con-
travenes settled constitutional law concerning the rights of parents
and children. Despite claims to the contrary, the subordination of
the child's liberty interest is, in fact, another new, literally unprec-
edented premise in constitutional jurisprudence. 140
10 Two red flags, portending a major shift in juvenile delinquency jurisprudence, had
preceded this section of Schall.
The first red flag appeared in the Scholl Court's offhand statement early in the opinion
that juvenile proceedings; in light of the state statutory scheme and state case law, are civil
rather than criminal. Schall, 467 U.S. at 257 n.4.
The majority preceded the above statement with this sentence:
[The Family Court) is charged not with finding guilt and affixing punish-
ment [citation omitted], but rather with determining and pursuing the needs
and best interests of the child insofar as those are consistent with the need for
the protection of the community.
Id. (citing N.Y. Fam. CT. Acr § 301.1 (McKinney 1983) and In re Craig, 57 A.D.2d 761, 394
N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977)). Article Three of the Family Court Act, New York's juvenile delinquency
statute, however, stands for more than a simple determination of the child's best interests
and the protection of the community. Section 301.1 of the Family Court Act in its entirety
reads:
The purpose of this article is to establish procedures in accordance with due
process of law (a) to determine whether a person is a juvenile delinquent and
(b) to issue an appropriate order of dispostion for any person who is adjudged
a juvenile delinquent. In any proceeding under this article, the court shall
consider the needs and best interest of the respondent as well as the need for
protection of the community.
As the practice commentary to the FCA notes, the intent of Article Three, passed in 1982
as the first major revision of New York's juvenile delinquency laws since the 1962 establish-
ment of the Family Court, "is the establishment of uniform procedures to govern every
aspect of delinquency proceedings from arrest through appeal." Sobie, Introductory Practice
Commentary to Fam. CI. Act, Art. 3 at 260 (McKinney 1983). While section 301.1 of the ECA
notes the purposes mentioned by the majority, formal procedures protecting due process
rights of accused juveniles are a concomitant clear priority of Article Three, unmentioned
by the majority. Schall, 467 U.S. at 267.
This procedural regularity had been increasingly required by the Supreme Court's own
cases which have, since 1967, treated juvenile delinquency proceedings as "criminal." The
Court in Gault concluded flatly that
[a] proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delin-
quent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seri-
ousness to a felony prosecution.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
In this portion of the Gault opinion, the Court granted fifth amendment protection to
all statements by juveniles regarding alleged delinquent behavior even though Arizona called
delinquency proceedings "civil" proceedings. Accepting Arizona's appellation, the Gault Court
noted, "would be to disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the 'civil' label-
of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings." Gault, 387 U.S. at 50. The
Gault Court also found that "commitment to a state institution" is "a deprivation of liberty
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D. The Formulation of the Second Inquiry: The Truncation of
Mathews
The Schall majority also examined whether the procedures af-
forded juveniles detained prior to factfinding provided sufficient
. . . . It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil.'" Id. at 49-
50. See also Schall, 467 U.S. at 282 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Thus, although the Schall Court labeled these juvenile proceedings as "civil," its own
precedents had long since obliged the Court to incorporate into these civil proceedings most
of the constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants. By so distorting precedent,
the Schall Court signalled its departure from basic tenets of juvenile rights jurisprudence
and laid the foundation for the continuing revisionist history of settled constitutional prin-
Ciple.
The second red flag appeared in a preliminary discussion of parens patriae. In Schall, the
majority states its version of Gault and its progeny and introduces its two pronged due process
analysis by noting that "[t]he state has 'a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting
the welfare of the child,' which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from
the adult criminal trial." Schall, 467 U.S. at 263 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
766 (1982)). Santosky is only relevant because it supplies the necessary words. The decision
did not pertain at all to the delinquency context and does not support yet another of the
majority's unprecedented pronouncements on the juvenile delinquency proceeding. In Gault,
the Court had, in fact, noted in its review of the history of the juvenile court movement,
that:
[The early reformers' goals] were to be achieved, without coming to conceptual
and constitutional grief, by insisting that the proceedings were not adversary,
but that the state was proceeding as parens patriae [footnote omitted]. The Latin
phrase proved to be of great help to those who sought to rationalize the
exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky
and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance. The phrase was taken from
chancery.practice, where, however, it was used to describe the power of the
state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property interests
and the person of the child [footnote omitted]. But there is no trace of the
doctrine in the history of criminal jurisprudence. At common law, children
under seven were considered incapable of possessing criminal intent. Beyond
that age, they were subjected to arrest, trial, and in theory to punishment like
adult offenders [footnote omitted]. In these old days, the state was not deemed
to have authority to accord them fewer procedural rights than adults.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1967).
Several commentators have focussed upon the return to pre-Gault jurisprudence through
the resurrection of parens patriae doctrine. A very thoughtful student note capably explores
Schall's parens patriae bent. Note, Pretrial Detention of Juveniles: Denial of Equal Protection Masked
by the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 95 YALE L. J. 174 (1985).
With this inapposite citation of Santosky, the Court revived the long-abandoned parens
patriae reasoning in juvenile justice jurisprudence. Subsequent state and federal cases have
relied upon this re-emergence of parens patriae reasoning in this area. United States v.
Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2nd Cir. 1986); Sadler v. Sullivan, 748 F.2d 820 (1984); in
the Matter of L.Z., C.R.P., and S.L.P., 396 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. 1986); In the Matter of
Shannon B., 122 A.D.2d 268, 505 N.Y.S.2d 179 (A.D, 2 Dept. 1986); In the Matter of
Terence G., 109 A.D.2d 440, 429 N.Y.S.2d 365 (A.D. 1st Dept. 1985). At least one court has
criticized the revival. Bergren v. City of Milwaukee, 811 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1987). With
these two red flags waving, the majority began its two-inquiry analysis of due process consid-
erations.
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protection against erroneous and unnecessary deprivations of lib-
erty. This analysis rested upon a transformation of the procedural
due process analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge.' 4 '
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court held that the due process
clause of the fifth amendment does not require that a recipient of
Social Security disability benefits be afforded an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing prior to the administrative termination of ben-
efit payments. The Schall Court referred to Mathews, in which Justice
Powell enunciated three distinct factors generally required for the
identification of the specific dictates of due process:
(1) First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; (2) second, (a) the risk of erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the procedures used, and
(b) the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and (3) finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail. 142
Based upon its misrepresentation of Lehman and Gault, the
Schall majority had concluded that the first Mathews factor, the
private interest affected, was a qualified liberty interest enjoyed by
the juvenile. In conjunction with its truncated Kennedy analysis and
its misappropriation of Santosky, the Schall majority had also already
concluded that the third Mathews factor, the Government's interest,
was "legitimate"'43 and "weighty."'" The remaining second factor,
(a) the risk of error and (b) the probable value of other procedural
safeguards remained to be discussed.
The majority's analysis of (2)(a), the risk of error in current
procedure, included a review of pre-detention procedure in light
of Gerstein v. Pugh and a discussion of the case law involving judicial
prediction of future criminal conduct and the good faith of the
family court judges in current procedures. 145 Schall summarily and
"' 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
142 Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1976)) (numbering and
lettering supplied).
1" See supra note 97 for a discussion of the Schall Court's analysis of the government's
interest as "legitimate."
"4 See supra note 84 For a discussion of the Schall Court's analysis of the government's
interest as "weighty."
"5 See infra notes 151-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the majority's
treatment of Gerstein. See infra notes 171-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
accuracy of judicial predictions of future criminal conduct.
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inconclusively addressed (2)(b), the probable value of additional or
substitute procedures, in a single sentence followed by one footnote.
"Appellees have failed to note any additional procedures that would
significantly improve the accuracy of the determination without
unduly impinging on the achievement of legitimate state pur-
poses." 346
This formulation contains two unfounded assumptions. First,
Mathews never suggested that failure of the plaintiffs to plead the
necessity of additional procedures relieved the Court of the duty to
conceive and require such procedures. In Schall, the plaintiff juve-
niles could only have so pleaded at the expense of their theory of
the case that the judicial predictions of dangerousness are so fatally
flawed that no additional procedures could possibly increase their
accuracy.
Second, Schall's statement presumed that the proceedings had
been found to be accurate at some foundational level. Because the
majority had not addressed the accuracy of the determination up
to this point in the analysis, and never did address this point, the
Court, in fact, had not made a baseline evaluation of accuracy.' 47
The Court was, therefore, in no position to analyze whether the
proceedings' accuracy had been improved. On the other hand, if
the Schall Court accepted the plaintiffs' contention that additional
procedures could not enhance the accuracy of the proceedings, then
only issue (2)(a) would remain: is the risk of error in the existing
procedures acceptable?'48
 Either way, this statement required the
Schall majority to address squarely an issue that it in fact ignored:
how accurate is the detention determination made by the family
court?"9
 In short, the Schall opinion never fulfilled its duty, enun-
Li" Schall v, Martin, 467 U.S. 253,277 (1984).
17 See supra notes 171-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of the district court's
finding that the assessment of dangerousness in the proceedings is generally inaccurate.
14 " See infra notes 151-201 and accompanying text for a discussion of this aspect of the
analysis.
I" To examine in more depth how this premature analysis confuses rather than aids the
reader, consider the following analysis made by the Schall majority in its footnotes. In the
footnote to the single sentence that discussed the Mathews (2)(b) factor, the probable value
of additional or substitute procedures, the majority noted that Judge Newman, concurring
in Strathurg II did offer four statutory improvements:
[(i)] limitations on the crimes for which the juvenile has been arrested or which
he is likely to commit if' released; [(ii)l a determination of the likelihood that
the juvenile committed the crime [e.g. probable cause] [(iii)] an assessment of
the juvenile's background; and [(iv)] a more specific standard of proof.
Wadi, 467 U.S. at 277 n.29.
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ciated in the (2)(b) requirement of Mathews, to explore the probable
accuracy-enhancing value of any additional or substitute proce-
dures.' 5°
Rather than considering the accuracy of current procedures and then considering the prob-
able additional value of each recommended procedure, as Mathews requires, the majority
instead dismissed each in turn perfunctorily.
With respect to (i) and (ii), the majority wrote, "[t]he first and second of these suggestions
has already been considered." Id. at 277 n.29 (referring the reader back to footnotes 18 and
27 of the opinion). Footnote 18, however, simply states that limiting the categories of crimes
that justify detention resides wholly with the state legislature. It further states that because
the overbreadth doctrine does not apply outside first amendment analysis, such a challenge
must be made on a case-by-case, rather than class, basis. Id. at 268 n.18. Even if plaintiffs
misstructured their constitutional challenge or asked the Court to exert a legislative function,
such mistakes by plaintiffs do not absolve the Court from addressing the Mathews (2)(b)
criterion: whether the additional procedure, however implemented, would improve the accuracy
of the procedure. Footnote 18 did not dispose of the Court's duty under Mathews to consider
that improvement.
The majority added to this discussion that there is no indication that delimiting the
category of crimes justifying detention would improve the accuracy of the detention deter-
mination in any respect. The majority stated this flat conclusion without further discussion
or citation. No facts or reasoning supported this conclusory statement of the issue that the
majority was required, by Mathews, to explore in depth.
Footnote 27 addressed whether (ii) a determination of the likelihood that the juvenile
committed the crime would enhance the accuracy of the procedures. Footnote 27 suggested
only that a family court judge could make a finding of' probable cause, if she so desired, and
noted that plaintiffs failed to point to a "single example" where probable cause was not later
established. Id. at 276 n.27. Again, the majority shifted its own burden to the plaintiffs,
irrelevantly, because Mathews obliged the Court to consider whether requiring the family court
judge to find probable cause or else dismiss the petition at the initial appearance would lower
the risk of error in detention. Thus, Judge Newman's second improvement went unad-
dressed.
The Scholl Court contended that it addressed in later text the probable accuracy-en-
hancing value of (iii) an assessment of the juvenile's background. Schutt, 467 U.S. at 278 n.29.
Yet, the sole reference to such an assessment appeared in the majority's summary of the
testimony of one family court judge as to what evidence judges currently consider in detention
determinations. This is not an assessment that the Family Court Act requires all judges to
make. Nor did the Schall majority consider whether requiring such an assessment would
reduce the risk of error in detention decisions. The Schall Court, therefore, also failed to
explore fully this potential improvement.
The majority also contended that it addressed in later text the probable accuracy-
enhancing value of (iv) a more specific standard of proof for "serious risk that the juvenile"
will commit a crime before the return date. Scholl, 467 U.S. at 278 n.29. On the four pages
that follow this footnote, however, the Schall majority makes no reference to a standard of
proof.
The footnote to the single sentence, therefore, shed no light on the application of the
Mathews (2)(b) requirement to the Schall context.
1 " For an examination of the accuracy-enhancing value of the safeguards suggested by
Judge Newman, see Ewing, supra note 13, at 200-06. Professor Ewing concludes that the risk
of erroneous deprivations of liberty interests under the New York preventive detention
statute is reduced very little by the suggested procedural safeguards. Id. at 206.
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E. The Expansion of Post-Arrest Administrative Detention: The
Misreading of Gerstein
In the context of both pre-detention procedure and judicial
prediction of future criminal conduct, the Schall majority consis-
tently focused on irrelevant factors in existing procedures and in
the case law. Further, the Court ignored altogether central holdings
or premises in controlling precedents. After examining the discus-
sion of Gerstein v. Pugh' 51 in this section and the judicial prediction
cases in the next, the article briefly revisits the Mathews factors to
examine the Schall opinion as a whole.
Schall relied upon Gerstein to support its conclusion that the
length of pre-trial preventive detention can be flexible without vi-
olating the fourth amendment. Schall's conclusion, while claiming
to rest on Gerstein, in fact distorted Gerstein's ruling on the issue of
probable cause.
In Gerstein, the Court, speaking again through Justice Powell,
addressed two issues: (I) "whether a person arrested and held for
trial on an information is entitled to a judicial determination of
probable cause for detention, and, if so" 152 (2) whether an adversary
hearing is required by the fourth amendment for that determina-
tion.' 5" The Gerstein Court held that (I) "the Fourth Amendment
requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite
to extended restraint of liberty following arrest" 154 and that (2) the
fourth amendment does not require that the determination be made
in an adversarial hearing.' 55
In its analysis of probable cause, the Gerstein Court noted that:
[t]he consequences of prolonged detention may be more
serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial
confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his
source of income, and impair his family relationships.
[citations omitted]. Even pre-trial release may be accom-
panied by burdensome conditions that effect a significant
restraint of liberty. [citations omitted]. When the stakes
are this high, the detached judgment of a neutral magis-
trate is essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish
1 " 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
152 1d. at 111.
Iss Id.
I " Id. at 114. This holding is on the page cited by the majority in Schall.
m Id. at 120.
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meaningful protection from unfounded interference with
liberty.' 56
The Gerstein Court expressly denied that "prosecutorial judgment
standing alone meets the requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment."'" The &hall Court, in contrast, authorized pre-trial deten-
tion merely on a prosecutorial showing of good cause. In requiring
the judicial pre-detention probable cause determination, Justice
Powell expressly defined probable cause to be "facts and circum-
stances 'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the
[suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.'' 158
In its analysis of the need for an adversarial hearing, the Ger-
stein Court noted that "the nature of the probable cause determi-
nation usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pre-trial pro-
cedure viewed as a whole," 159 and explicitly "recognize[d] the
desirability of flexibility and experimentation by the States."'" In
that same paragraph, the Gerstein majority concluded:
[w]hatever procedure a State may adopt, it must provide
a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a
condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty and
this determination must be made by a judicial officer ei-
ther before or promptly after arrest. 1 e'
In short, the Gerstein Court held that a judge must find probable
cause for arrest before ordering significant pre-trial restraint, en-
dorsing flexibility only in the form of that judicial determination.
Justice Powell endorsed detention before the judicial determination
of probable cause solely for the "brief period of detention to take
the administrative steps incident to arrest." 162
Nevertheless, when the .Schall majority reported the Gerstein
requirement of a judicial determination of probable cause as a
condition of detention, it stated that "[the Court] did not . . .
mandate a specific timetable." 165 The majority focused on the Ger-
stein Court's use of the word "extended," assuming a fact never
approved by the Gerstein Court, that a probable cause determination
06
	 at 114.
'" Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117.
1 " Id. at I 1 1 (brackets in original; citations omitted).
,59 /d. at 123.
' 5° Id.
161 Id. at 124-25 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
162 Id. at 114.
' 65 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 275 (1984).
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would still be considered "predetention" if it happened within sev-
eral days of the arrestee's arrest, that is, before "extended restraint"
on his liberty.'64
The Schall majority thus transposed the virtue of flexibility
from the form to the timing of the probable cause determination.
The Gerstein Court allowed the form of the pre-detention probable
cause determination to be flexible, but not the time frame in which
it occurred. The Schall majority applied that flexibility inappro-
priately to the timing of the probable cause determination. Thus,
even though the New York statutory scheme did not mandate a
probable cause determination until three days, and sometimes six
days,' 6' of detention had passed, the Schall Court concluded that
such "flexible" procedures pass constitutional muster.
In Schall's footnote 28, the majority asserted that the Gerstein
Court had "indicated approval" of "pre-trial detention procedures
that supplied a probable-cause hearing within five days of the initial
detention." 16" In fact, Gerstein never indicated such approval.
Rather, the Gerstein footnote to which the Schall Court referred
described a proposed draft of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure that in fact entitled the arrestee to two probable cause de-
terminations. First, upon arrest, the arrestee would be entitled to a
determination "without unnecessary delay . • before a magistrate
. . . that grounds exist for issuance of an arrest warrant."' 67 Second, the
arrestee, if he remained in custody for inability to qualify for pre-
trial release, would be entitled to "another opportunity for a probable
cause determination at the detention hearing, held no more than
five days after arrest."' 68
Thus, the post-detention probable-cause determination "ap-
proved" by the Gerstein Court was actually a second level of deter-
16.1 1d. at 275. As the passages cited earlier from page 120 of Gerstein suggest, Justice
Powell may have been leaving the door open to the conclusion that a post-arrest pre-trial
release with conditions also had to be preceded by a judicial determination of probable cause.
That possibility may well be the reason for the Gerstein majority's use of the word "extended,"
because a pretrial period for a defendant out in the community (who may be reporting
weekly to a probation officer, etc.) during a long adjournment pending trial would also,
under its reasoning, constitute an "extended restraint on liberty," If so, the majority may
have had no intention of leaving the door open to the distortion the Schall analysis has
worked.
m N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr 325.2 (McKinney 1983) (three days with potential extension for
good cause shown). See supra note 102 for a more precise calculation of maximum potential
detention periods.
166 Schall, 467 U.S. at 277 n.28 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 124 n.25).
' 07 Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 124 n.25 (emphasis added).
168 1d. (emphasis added).
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mination; the first determination must have taken place immedi-
ately after arrest. The scheme approved in the Gerstein footnote
protects the criminal defendant by affording him two probable
cause hearings within five days. By contrast, under Schall, the state
may detain the juvenile after arrest a full six days without a single
probable cause hearing.' 69 Thus, by transposing "flexibility of form
of the determination" into "flexibility of timing," the Schall Court
marshalled the precedential force of Gerstein for a cause utterly
repugnant to its spirit.' 7°
F. The Accuracy of Judicial Predictions of Dangerousness: The
Bolstering of Z urek, Greenholtz and Morrissey
As a second part of its analysis of accuracy under Mathews, the
Schall Court rejected plaintiffs' claim, supported by the district
court, in Strasburg 1 171 that it is virtually impossible to predict future
criminal conduct with any degree of accuracy. The Schall majority
held instead that "from a legal point of view there is nothing in-
herently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal con-
duct."' 72 The majority stressed that Isluch a judgment forms an
169 Later lower courts examining Schall noted this error by the Court. Faheem-El v.
Klincar, 814 F.2d 461, 474-75 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Garza, 754 F.2d 1202, 1211
n.2 (1985).
170 The majority also contended that the "flexible" procedures of the FCA "have been
found constitutionally adequate . . . under the Due Process Clause." Schall, 467 U.S. at 277
(citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)). Yet Kent, a precursor to the Gault opinion,
explicitly declined to address the constitutionality of pre-trial detention schemes.
On page 557 of the Kent opinion, the page cited in Schall, the Kent Court concluded that
a sixteen-year old respondent was entitled both to a hearing assisted by counsel enjoying
ample discovery and to a statement of reasons from the court before his delinquency pro-
ceeding was transferred from the state juvenile court to the federal district court. While the
procedures approved in Kent mildly resembled the New York procedures, the Kent Court
considered them in a wholly different context: not the context of detention, but rather the
context of waiver of exclusive jurisdiction in favor of a higher-sentencing court. Kent, 383
U.S. at 543, 546, 552, 557.
The Kent Court explicitly refused to address the issue of detention at two points in the
opinion. In footnote 3, Justice Fortas in Kent describes the 1965 District of Columbia pro-
cedures for arraignment for probable cause after arrest. While noting the differences between
treatment of adults and juveniles, Justice Fortas concluded "[w]e indicate no view as to the
legality of these practices." Id. at 545 n.3. And on pages 551 and 552 of the opinion, the
Court first lists the petitioner's grounds for reversal, including the unlawfulness of the
detention, and concludes "fhlowever, because we remand the case on account of the proce-
dural error with respect to waiver of jurisdiction, we do not pass on these questions." Id. at
552 (footnote omitted).
Kent, like Gerstein, did not validate the New York Family Court Act arraignment and
detention procedures.
171 Strasburg I, 513 F. Supp. 691 (1981).
372 Schall, 467 U.S. at 278.
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important element in many decisions" and invoked jurek v. Texas 13
(7urek"); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmatesrm ("Greenholtz"); and
Morrissey v. Brewer 13 ("Morrissey") to support its position. 176
The Schall majority ignored the issue raised by the Mathews
(2)(a) criterion, risk of erroneous deprivation of private interest, by
focusing not upon the question of whether a prediction can be
accurate, but rather upon the far more simplistic question of
whether the prediction can be made or "attain[ed]." The Schall
majority enshrined current practice, refusing to question whether
that practice might be so inaccurate as to be constitutionally infirm.
As a result, the Schall majority never refuted the clear finding of
the Strasburg district court that predictions of future criminal con-
duct cannot be made accurately.
The district court in Strasburg I had relied upon expert litera-
ture supporting the contention by experts at trial that
no method had yet been devised which could predict with
any acceptable degree of accuracy that a juvenile shall
commit a crime, particularly the commission of an offense
in a short space of time, as the judge must do in making
his [FCA § 320.5 (3)(b)] decision.'"
One expert at trial asserted that he would be surprised if recom-
mendations, based on family court intake interviews by probation
officers prior to the initial appearance, were any "better than
chance." This same expert assessed the judge's subjective prediction
as "only 4% better than chance." 178 The district court therefore
concluded that "no reliable method of predicting dangerousness,
whether clinical or actuarial in nature exists at this time."'" The
district court concluded also that a family court judge's opinion,
lacking any methodological refinement, is "a fortiori" "also unrelia-
ble," ruling that "it is clear that juveniles who are subject to [FCA
§ 320.5(3)(b)] detention have their freedom curtailed by judgments
that are untrustworthy and uninformed and without the requisite
rationality which due process mandates.' , I 80
'" 428 U.S. 262, 274-75 (1976) (as cited in footnote 30 of the Schall opinion).
"4 442 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979) (as cited in footnote 30 of the Schall opinion).
1 " 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (as cited in footnote 30 of the Schall opinion).
176 Schall, 467 U.S. at 278.
'" Strasburg I, 513 F. Supp. at 708.
"7" Id. See also Ewing, supra note 13.
' 79 Strasburg 1, 513 F. Supp. at 712.
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The Schall Court never addressed these district court findings,
and thus never refuted them.
The cases upon which the Schall Court relied held merely that,
in many circumstances, judges do make predictions of future crim-
inal conduct. These cases never addressed whether judges make
those predictions accurately. Furthermore, Morrissey, Jurek, and
Greenholtz examined predictions undertaken after a conviction, and
undertaken on the basis of hearings in which counsel presented
evidence and arguments. In such cases, the hearing examiners had
before them "all possible relevant information.""' Neither Morrissey,
nor Jurek, nor Greenholtz justified the use of a prediction to detain
a presumptively innocent juvenile absent a finding of probable cause
to believe that the juvenile committed the crime of which he was
accused.
In Morrissey, 182 the Court held that the due process clause re-
quires a state to afford an individual certain procedures prior to
revoking his parole.' 83 In so ruling, the Morrissey Court began "with
the proposition that the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal
prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in
such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations."'" Thus,
the Morrissey parolee, unlike the Schall juvenile arrestee, enjoyed no
presumption of innocence because the parolee stood convicted of
criminal activity either by proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a
plea of guilty. Nevertheless, the parolee under Morrissey is entitled,
after arrest, to a hearing before an "independent officer" 185 "con-
ducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation
or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest while infor-
mation is fresh and sources are available."' 86 The purpose of the
hearing is to determine whether or not there exists probable cause
I" Ewing notes the Court's repeated emphasis throughout the case law on the importance
of the extensive information made available to the decision-maker. See Ewing, supra note 13,
at 208 and n.238.
"32 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
1 " Id. at 489. These safeguards were: (a) written notice of claimed violations of parole;
(b) disclosure to parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses (unless good cause for suspending right is shown); (e) a neutral and
detached hearing body (may be non-judicial) and (f) a written statement by the factfinders
as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. Id. The Morrissey Court did not
reach or decide the question whether the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained
counsel or to appointed counsel if indigent.
184 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480. This is the page cited by the majority in Scholl.
'" Id. at 486.
I" Id. at 485.
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to believe . the parolee committed an act violating a condition of his
parole.'" Thus, the parolee in Morrissey, even with his truncated
civil rights, enjoyed a right denied to the New York juvenile arrestee
under Schall: a prompt objective determination upon arrest that
there is probable cause to believe that he committed acts violating
his parole. Because the Morrissey decision never considered the ac-
curacy of the determination, one can only wonder how the Schall
majority could rely upon Morrissey in fulfilling the Schall Court's
mandate to examine the accuracy of judicial proceedings.
In Jurek,' 88 a three-justice plurality allowed a sentencing jury
in a capital case to address "the probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society."'" The plurality noted that "prediction of future
criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions .
rendered throughout our criminal justice system."`'" Again, Jurek
focused simply on the fact that courts frequently make predictions,
and did not address whether these frequent predictions are accu-
rate.
Jurek stressed that "what is essential [for the jury's determina-
tion] is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information
about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine."' 91
The Jurek scheme thus provided for a full sentencing hearing, with
counsel presenting evidence and arguments to the jury on the ad-
visability of the death penalty. In contrast, the Schall preventive
detention scheme involves no equally thorough hearing. The Jurek
Court noted that the Texas law "clearly assures" that all possible
relevant information "will be adduced." jurek emphasized this point,
while in contrast, the majority in Schall failed even to mention it. 192
' 97 See id. at 479-80,487.
" 8 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
I " Id. at 277.
' 90 Id. at 275. Thefurek plurality cited decisions in only three contexts: (1) bail hearings
in capital cases; (2) sentencing; and (3) parole determinations. Moreover, even these examples
in Jurek relied upon citations to drafts of model statutes, rather than existing statutory law.
Id. at 275-76 nn.9-11.
' 9 ' jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 (emphasis added),
195 Signiticantly,furek never even addressed the issue for which it was cited by the Schall
majority.
Thefurek plurality never addressed the accuracy of predictions, focussing instead solely
on the fact that such predictions are made "countless times each day throughout the American
system of criminal justice." Id. at 276. Nowhere in the Jurek opinion is statistical data of the
kind presented in Strasburg I even acknowledged. See text accompanying notes 177-80, supra,
for the statistical data used by the Strasburg I Court, The majority quotes furek in Schall for
the proposition that the Court has already specifically rejected the contention "that it is
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Finally, in Greenholtz,i 9s the Court held that a prisoner does not
have a protectable liberty interest in a discretionary parole-release
determination made by a state board of parole. In Greenholtz, the
majority focused upon the deprivation of rights worked by the
prisoner's conviction of a crime: "the conviction, with all its proce-
dural safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right: 1Gliven a valid
conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally de-
prived of his liberty.'' 194 In distinguishing Morrissey, the Greenholtz
Court stressed the difference between "being deprived of a liberty
one has," such as revocation of parole, and "being denied a condi-
tional liberty that one desires," such as initial release on parole.' 95
After invoking Morrissey, ,Jurek and Greenholtz, the majority in
Schall noted that the family court judge based her decision on "as
much information as can be obtained at the initial appearance."
The Schall majority appeared to have equated the initial appearance
with the exhaustive Texas jury hearing in jurek, the statutory factors
in Greenholtz, and the Morrissey parole revocation hearings, all of
which follow a conviction of guilt. In contrast, the brief hearing
concerning detention in Schall, held as part of the initial appearance,
occurred only hours after arrest and only minutes after appoint-
ment of counsel for the presumptively innocent juvenile arrestee.
impossible to predict future behavior and the question is so vague as to be meaningless."
Schall, 467 U.S. at 279 (quoting Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274).
Interestingly enough, the Jurek plurality responded to the quoted challenge by calling
the determination "difficult," but capable of being made. The Court in furek never suggested
with what accuracy that decision could be made.
For a more thoroughgoing and far more eloquent critique of Jurek, see C. BLACK, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 111-34 (1981).
L95 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
194 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,224 (1976)).
195 Id. at 9. The majority in Greenholtz cited Mathews for the proposition that "the quantum
and quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the need to serve the
purpose of minimizing the risk of error." Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13. The Greenholtz Court
concluded that because the Nebraska parole procedure affords an opportunity to be heard
and notice as to the reason why parole is denied, it affords the process that is due. In that
regard, the Court noted:
No ideal, error-free way to make parole-release decisions has been developed;
the whole question has been and will continue to be the subject of experimen-
tation involving analysis of psychological factors combined with fact evaluation
guided by the practical experience of the actual parole decisionmakers in pre-
dicting future behavior.
Id. Finally, the Greenholtz Court appends to its opinion the statutory factors that the board
must consider in deciding whether or not to grant parole. See id. at 16-18.
Note that Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Greenholtz, criticized the Court's "purported
reliance" on Morrissey and Mathews. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 32-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The Schall majority's discussion of family court procedure in
light of Morrissey, Jura, and Greenholtz was completely irrelevant in
light of Mathews's second requirement that judicial procedures af-
fecting due process interests be accurate. All three cases address
the mere prevalence of predictions of a defendant's future danger-
ousness, and not the accuracy of those predictions. All three cases
involve proceedings wholly distinguishable from those at issue in
Schall. The family court in Schall made the prediction about pre-
sumptively innocent juveniles in a preliminary context after arrest
and before trial. The Courts in jurek, Morrissey, and Greenholtz made
the predictions about adults in a post-conviction context.
By relying on cases that discuss not the accuracy, but simply
the prevalence of predictions of future conduct in post-conviction
criminal proceedings, the Schall majority avoided having to address
the plaintiffs' challenge to the statistical reliability of judicial pre-
dictions. Essentially, the majority changed the question from "How
accurate are the predictions made?" to "Are the predictions made
'based on as much information as can reasonably be obtained at the
initial appearance?"I 96
 The plaintiffs asked, "Should we not change
the procedures because they are based on fundamentally inaccurate
activity?"; and the majority answered, inappropriately, "The family
court judges are doing the best they can." 197
Even if the family court judges are doing the best they can,
expert literature led the district court in Strasburg 1 to conclude that
there was "no reliable method of predicting dangerousness, whether
clinical or actuarial in nature."'" This simple and unrefuted finding
by the district court suggested that the Schall majority's reliance on
the good faith' 99
 of the family court judge missed the point. Infinite
' 96
 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 279 (1984),
197 See id. at 278-80,
198 Strasburg I, 513 F. Supp. 691, 712 (1981). Ewing offers an in-depth survey of the
literature concerning the accuracy of the prediction of dangerousness and the literature's
relationship to the FCA preventive detention statute. Ewing, supra note 13, at 181-206.
199
 The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have consistently used "good faith" analysis in
their criminal jurisprudence. For instance, the good faith exception to the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule provides that if evidence was obtained by a police officer who reasonably
believed he had justification to search either because of probable cause, an ordinance that
was later overturned, or a warrant invalidly issued by a magistrate, this evidence need not
be suppressed. The Court has subsequently upheld the good faith exception. E.g., United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-25 (1984) (evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable
reliance on a search warrant issued by a magistrate was acceptable even though the warrant
was ultimately found to be invalid); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-91 (1984)
(evidence seized under defective warrant was admissible because police reasonably thought
warrant was valid); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35-40 (1979) (evidence obtained in
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good faith and sincerity cannot change the fact that the family court
judge is engaged in a fundamentally impossible task. In short, the
Schall majority simply never addressed the relevance of the statistical
evidence to the crucial second issue raised by Mathews: the risk of
erroneous deprivation of a juvenile's interest in liberty through the
detention procedures. However conscientiously the family court
decisions might be made, the district court found by unrefuted
evidence that such decisions, nonetheless, present an' unacceptable
risk of error. 20" The Supreme Court in Schall ignored its duty to
defer to the district court's findings of fact, assuming instead a
completely contradictory position. 20 '
G. Mathews Revisited: Schall's Distortions Summarized
The structure of the Schall majority's analysis and its reliance
upon inappropriate precedent reveals the fact that the Schall opin-
ion is founded upon fundamental flaws in legal reasoning. The
majority structured the Schall analysis in such a way that the Mathews
tripartite approach was collapsed into two inquiries. In its first
inquiry, the majority addressed the first Mathews factor, the private
search conducted under valid ordinance was admissible even though such ordinance was
later declared unconstitutional). In a similar vein, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
Court in two cases in which a prisoner was injured because of the negligence of prison
officials. In each case, the Court held that the prisoner could not be compensated for mere
lack of due care on the part of the official, notwithstanding the injury suffered. See Daniels
v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662,664-67 (1986) (prisoner injured because officials failed to exercise
due care in protecting him from another inmate could not recover on due process grounds).
In all three cases the good faith of the official involved outweighed the constitutional
rights of the other party—the Court focused on the behavior of the official rather than upon
the injury suffered by the individual.
Similarly, the majority's discussion of post-detention procedures does not erase the
unacceptable risk of error. The majority notes that the family court judge may reconsider
her decision to detain and the state supreme court, appellate division, and even the court of
appeals may review a detention decision under various review and habeas procedures. Yet,
even if those reviews could happen instantaneously, the district court's findings that no
procedure can provide an accurate prediction of the likelihood of future criminal behavior
remains dispositive. A second consideration by a higher court or even the same judge has
no greater accuracy in that attempt at prediction than did the family court judge in the first
instance. These post-detention procedures not only fail to relieve the risk of error, but they
also threaten to compound one flawed determination with additional ones.
One commentator, a former legal aid attorney representing juveniles, discussed the
impossibility of timely effective review of wrongful detention. Rush, The Warren and Burger
Courts on State, Parent and Child Conflict Resolution: A Comparative Analysis and Proposed Meth-
odology, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 461 (1985).
2°1 This is the second failure of the Court to follow the mandates of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
See .supra note 107 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Schall Court's analysis of
this rule.
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interest affected, and the third Mathews factor, the governmental
interest.
The Schall Court addressed the private interest affected in its
discussions of custody and parental control. By misapplying Lehman
to placement of children in state institutions, a context that Lehman
had explicitly distinguished from its own, the Schall majority was
able to conclude that children's liberty interests are qualified by
their state of constant custody. By relying upon Gault, first for
outdated statistics, and then for a proposition the Gault Court went
on to repudiate, the majority was able to quote Gault frequently
throughout the Schall opinion. The Schall majority used the Santosky
name in support of a wholly new proposition that the child's liberty
interest must be subordinated to the state's wrens patriae duty, while
ignoring the plain antidetention bent of Santosky's deference to
parental rights. The Schall Court addressed the issue of govern-
mental interest through its Kennedy analysis. By truncating the Ken-
nedy analysis, however, the Schall Court was able to conclude that
juvenile preventive detention was not punitive.
The Schall Court's second inquiry purported to address the
remaining Mathews criterion, the accuracy of governmental proce-
dures guaranteeing due process. The majority transformed Ger-
stein's narrow approval of post-arrest administrative detention into
a broad mandate to the government to hold arrestees for indefinite
periods of time. The Scholl majority neither addressed nor refuted
the Strasburg district court's finding that courts cannot predict dan-
gerousness with accuracy. Had the Schall majority examined the
accuracy, as opposed to the prevalence, of judicial determinations
of dangerousness, the Court could not have skirted the necessary
conclusion: that the risk of error feared in Mathews was rampant
throughout family court detention determinations.
It would be disturbing enough merely to draw the conclusion
that the Schall opinion was founded on a pattern of distortion of
major precedents. Unfortunately, as section four demonstrates,
Schall's contrived and contorted reasoning also presaged further
revolution far beyond the juvenile detention context.
IV. THE RIPPLE EFFECT OF SCIIALL
The thorough distortion of constitutional principle in the Scholl
opinion makes clear that Schall, in the guise of deference to prec-
edent, has deeply disrupted the development of constitutional doc-
trine involving children. In addition, because of the way in which
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constitutional principles develop over time, through a series of
cases, Schall has had indirect consequences. It has worked a subtle
revolution in substantive and procedural due process analysis, post-
arrest detention, and the presumption of innocence. United States v.
Salerno, 202 the first Supreme Court case to cite Schall, reflects this
revolution.
A. The Revolution Within the Juvenile Justice Arena
Law review commentators have explored the ways in which the
Schall opinion implicitly repudiated the spirit and letter of Gault
and its progeny. 2" These scholars, concerned about juvenile justice
jurisprudence, have focused upon the direct effect that Schall has
had upon constitutional doctrine involving children and juvenile
delinquency proceedings. They have focused on the renunciation
of Gault, the reversion to parens patriae rationales, the lesser liberty
interest afforded children due to custody, and the unprecedented
subordination of the child's liberty interest to legitimate state inter-
ests.
The hopes of some of these juvenile justice commentators, that
Schall's effect would be limited by its juvenile-centered rationales,
were dashed by the Court's opinion in United States v. Salerno.
B. The Revolution in Constitutional Arenas Beyond Juvenile Justice
The 1987 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Salerno
made plain that Schall's distortions would not only infect the juvenile
justice corpus of doctrine but also would cripple crucial precedents
in other constitutional arenas. In Salerno, the district court had
detained Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro, who were charged
with "wide-ranging conspiracies to aid" "La Cosa Nostra" "enter-
prises through violent means." 204 Now Chief Justice Rehnquist,
202 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
203 The best discussions of the discontinuity of Schall with Gault and its progeny are the
sources cited in note 12, supra.
2' 4 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2099. As Justice Marshall detailed in his Salerno dissent, the
pretrial detention issues as to both Salerno and Cafaro appear to have become moot by the
time the case was argued to the Court on January 21, 1987. Salerno had been sentenced in
a separate case by a separate district court to one hundred years imprisonment on January
13, 1987. Justice Marshall noted that the Salerno district court then "released" him pending
further order'of the court. Noting the findings required of the district court for release after
sentencing, Justice Marshall wrote:
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again writing for a six member majority, 2°5 upheld adult preventive
detention under the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 ("the Act").
The Act allowed post-indictment pre-trial detention if the govern-
ment demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence, after an ad-
versary hearing, that no release conditions exist that "will reasonably
assure ... the safety of any other person and the community." 205
A brief outline of the Salerno analysis evinces the majority's
heavy reliance on Schall. With regard to the substantive due process
challenge, the Salerno Court concluded that the Act's preventive
detention provision did not constitute punishment, citing to Kennedy
through Bell and Schall, and again applying only two of the seven
Kennedy analytical factors to the specific detention at hand. 207
 The
majority cited Schall for the proposition that preventing danger to
the community is a legitimate regulatory goal. 2°8
 For reasons it did
not explain, the Salerno majority applied the truncated Kennedy
analysis more faithfully than the Court had in the Schall opinion.
The Salerno Court considered the legislative history of the Act,
which it failed to do in Schall. The Court also considered the seventh
factor of Kennedy, which it ignored in Schall, noting that the Act
"limits . . . detention . . . to the most serious of crimes." 209
The Court characterized the Act's detention as a "carefully"i°
focused exception to the general rule against pre-conviction deten-
In short, the District Court which had sentenced Salerno to 100 yeari' impris-
onment then found, with the Government's consent, that he was not dangerous,
in a vain attempt to keep alive the controversy as to Salerno's dangerousness
before this Court.
Id. at 2106 n.1 (Marshall, j., dissenting).
Cafaro had become a cooperating witness for the Government in October 1986, before
the petition for certiorari on the preventive detention issue had been granted by the Supreme
Court. He had been released on a personal recognizance bond of $1,000,000, ostensibly for
temporary medical care and treatment, He was plainly not in pretrial detention while this
issue was being argued and decided before the Court. Id, at 2106-07 & nn.2-3.
Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia joined the Chief Justice in
his opinion. The Schall dissenters, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, dissented in two
opinions in Salerno.
"i Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2097 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 3142(e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
One commentator has criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist for participating in the Salerno
decision. See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 512 n.3. Alschuler notes that the District of Columbia
Preventive Detention statute, upon which the Federal Bail Reform Act was modeled, was
authored in part by the Chief justice, when he served as Assistant. Attorney General in charge
of the Office of Legal Counsel.
2" Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101-2102.
"Id. at 2101.
209
 Id. In Schall, the FCA had no limitation on the kind of charges for which preventive
detention could be ordered. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 295 n.21 (Marshall, j., dissenting) (Tyrone
Parson detained five days for "enticing others to play three-card monte.").
210 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2105.
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tion, similar to the "exceptions" in Schall and Gerstein, 2 " and similar
to detention rules during times of war or insurrection and rules
allowing detention of mentally unstable or incompetent persons. 212
The Salerno majority used the truncated Mathews analysis in de-
fending the narrow focus of this new exception, and then briefly
considered the procedural requirements of the Act in determining
that the Act did not violate procedural due process requirements. 213
The Salerno Court neither acknowledged nor discussed the
Mathews 2(a) or (b) criteria, the risk of error in current procedure
and the probable value of additional or substitute procedures, re-
spectively. After dismissing the respondents' eighth amendment
cruel and unusual punishment claims, the Court briefly concluded
its opinion, noting that the Act's provisions for pre-trial detention
fall within a "carefully limited exception." 214
Thus, the Salerno Court relied heavily upon Schall to uphold
detention under the Act. The article will next examine the four
continuing distortions from Schall, as perpetuated in Salerno, to
examine the ripple effect flowing from Schall beyond the juvenile
justice realm.
1. Subtracting Substantive Due Process Limitations upon
Regulation: Kennedy to Bell to Schall to Salerno
By relying on the distortion of Kennedy first undertaken in Bell
and then perpetuated in Schall, the Salerno majority represented
the Kennedy analysis as a new three step test:
Unless Congress expressly intended to impose puni-
tive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction turns
on "'whether an alternative purpose to which [the restric-
tion] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned to [it]. "'215
The Salerno majority concluded that Congress intended detention
under the Act to serve as "a potential solution to a pressing societal
211 The majority's mischaracterization of Gerstein as a justification for detention is dis-
cussed below.
212 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2102.
213 Id. at 2102-03.
214 Id. at 2105.
215
 fd. at 2101.
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problem."21 t' Again, though it failed to do so in Schall, the Court
looked to legislative history, at least briefly, as did the Kennedy Court.
The majority cited Scholl for the proposition that "[t]here is no
doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legitimate
regulatory goal."' 7
The majority then concluded that "the incidents of pre-trial
detention [are not] excessive in relation to the regulatory goal." 218
As in Schall, for this portion of the analysis, the Salerno majority
evaluated the incidents of detention based solely upon the four
corners of the Act, noting, as in Scholl, the rights to a prompt
detention hearing and limits on the maximum length of pre-trial
detention. The Salerno Court also noted that the Act requires that
detainees be quartered in a "facility separate, to the extent practic-
able, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in
custody pending appeal." 2 " As in Schall, the majority failed to look
beyond the statute to examine the practical application of the sta-
tutory requirements.
In addition, in Salerno, the majority relied, as it could not in
Scholl, on the Act's "carefully limit[ing] the circumstances under
which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes."220 It
also did not expose another distinction between the Act and the
FCA: the Act administered preventive detention only after a finding
of probable cause (by the grand jury, in issuing the indictment),
while the FCA provided only for a judicial probable cause hearing
within three, and sometimes six, days.
By the time the Court had written the Salerno opinion, the
truncation of the Kennedy factors had become commonplace in our
substantive due process jurisprudence. The Salerno majority, in its
three paragraph "regulation/punishment" discussion, cited Schall
five times for the elements of that analysis. 2"




 Id. at 2102 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(2)).
22"Id. at 2101 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(1)).
22' Those reading the Schall opinion carefully most likely referred back to Bell, found
the quoted language, and assumed its soundness. Careful readers of Salerno would have even
a more difficult trail to Kennedy, because Kennedy is mentioned only once in the Salerno
opinion, and there only within a citation to Schall.
Through Bell, Schall, and Salerno, Kennedy has come to stand for a definition of regulation
contradicted by its own language.
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2. Legitimizing Detention after Arrests: Gerstein to Schall to
Salerno
The Schall Court's manipulation of Gerstein converted Justice
Powell's holding that "the Fourth Amendment requires a timely
judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to
detention"222
 into permission for detention of juveniles without a
Finding of probable cause. In Salerno, the majority completed the
transformation of Gerstein from its original position as enunciator
of individual rights to its current interpretation as protector of state
prerogative.
The Salerno majority included Gerstein in a list of cases in which
the Court has "repeatedly held that the government's regulatory
interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances,
outweigh an individual's liberty interest." 225 After listing examples
in which the Court has upheld preventive detention in times of war
or insurrection, with non-citizens, mentally unstable individuals,
and juveniles, the Salerno majority cited Gerstein for the proposition
that "[e]ven competent adults may face substantial liberty restric-
tions as a result of the operation of our criminal justice system. "224
This proposition, on its face, appears to contradict the more accu-
rate description of Gerstein's "limited post-arrest detention" used
later by the Salerno majority in comparing Gerstein to Salerno. The
proposition is even more at odds with Gerstein's own overt require-
ment of a probable cause determination as a condition of detention
and its endorsement of detention only for the "brief period ... to
take the administrative steps incident to arrest." 225
Through Schall and Salerno, the nature of Gerstein's holding has
been altered in the same manner in which Kennedy has been effec-
tively transformed. After Schall and Salerno, it appears that one may
cite Gerstein for the proposition that individuals may be detained
lawfully during a protracted administrative process prior to a find-
ing of probable cause. Thus, a challenge to a government's overly
lengthy administrative process could be denied constitutional weight
on the authority of Gerstein as cited through Schall and Salerno. 226
222 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975).
223 United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2101 (1987).
221 Id. at 2102. The majority also included in its list detention for risk of flight, which is
not a crime prevention concern, and danger to witnesses, without citation.
223
 Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
226 See Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 382-90 (2d Cir. 1988) (72 hour pre-arraignment
detention upheld pursuant to Gerstein and Schall).
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3. Dichotomizing the Three-Prong Analysis of Procedural Due
Process: Mathews to Schall to Salerno
The Salerno majority perpetuated Schall's amputation of the
second Mathews criteria by ignoring the second criteria altogether.
While the majority cited Mathews in discussing the requirement of
procedural due process, 227 it never addressed the second Mathews
factor: "The risk of erroneous deprivation of the [private interest]
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards." 228
As in Schall, the Court in Salerno merged the third Mathews
factor, "the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens," with the consideration
of a "legitimate regulatory goal." After arguing that the society's
interest in crime prevention in "these narrow circumstances" was
"legitimate,"229 "compelling," 230 and "heightened,"23 ' the Salerno
Court suggested that the analysis had only two parts, by turning to
"the other side of the scale, . . . the individual's strong interest in
liberty." 232 The majority in Salerno could not depend upon the
assertion in Schall that juveniles have a lesser right to liberty. In-
stead, the majority referred back to its list of exceptions and noted
"as our cases hold, this right may, in circumstances where the gov-
ernment's interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the
greater needs of society." 233
Salerno thus treated the procedural due process analysis as a
two-sided balancing process.234 The majority's response to a chal-
lenge to the statute on its face, however, suggests that it dismissed
the importance of the second Mathews criterion. As in Schall, the
majority in Salerno emphasized that a response to a facial challenge
requires only that procedures be "'adequate to authorize the pre-
trial detention of at least some [persons] charged with crimes,' 235
147 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101.
229 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U,S. 319, 335 (1976).
229 Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2101, 2102.
2,0 Id, at '2102, 2103.
251 Id. at 2103.
292 Id. (emphasis added).
2" Id.
2" And because now Schall could be cited for the proposition that the governmental
interest was "weighty," the result of the balancing test was a foregone conclusion. See supra
note 84 for a discussion of the history of the Schall Court's conclusion that crime prevention
is a weighty social objective.
2" Salerno, 107 S. Ct. at 2103 (quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 264).
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whether or not they might be insufficient in some particular circum-
stances."236 The Salerno Court relied on Schall in its suggestion that,
because the overbreadth doctrine has not been extended past the
first amendment, 237 any detention of an actually dangerous person
that results from the operation of the Act would save the Act from
a facial constitutional challenge. This analysis might, depending
upon the petitioner's framing of the legal issues before the Supreme
Court, eliminate the second Mathews criterion from application be-
cause it seems to make irrelevant the question of whether the risk
of erroneous detention is unacceptably high.
Had the Salerno majority applied the second Mathews criterion,
as deference to precedent requires, it would have been obliged to
evaluate not whether any detentions are justified, but rather whether
the risk of erroneous detentions would be unacceptable. Instead,
the majority repeated a non sequitur found in Schall. First, quoting
Schall, the majority simplistically stated that "there is nothing in-
herently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal con-
duct." 238
 Second, the Salerno Court examined the procedures in the
Act "specifically designed to further the accuracy of that determi-
nation."239 In this case, those procedures include a right to counsel
at the detention hearing, rights to testify, present evidence and
cross-examine witnesses, the right to proof by clear and convincing
evidence, constraints on the judicial officer determining appropri-
ateness of detention, and immediate appellate review of the deten-
tion decision. However "extensive" these "safeguards" 24° might be,
like the Schall procedures,24 ' they remain irrelevant to the Mathews
(2)(b) criterion, the "probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards," if indeed no procedures, no matter
how intricate, could ever make the procedure more accurate.242 The
Salerno opinion, like the Schall and Jurek opinions before it, dodged
the hard question that Mathews required the Court to face: can
predictions of dangerousness ever be accurate enough to be fair?
25'' Id. at 2103 (emphasis added).
2" Id. at 2100 (citing Schall, 467 U.S. at 268-69 n.18).
2" Id. at 2103 (quoting Schell, 467 U.S. at 278).
2" Id.
24° Id. at 2104.
211 See infra notes 151-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Schall proce-
dures.
' 42 (f. Ewing, supra note 13, at 200-06 (analysis of the safeguards Judge Newman
suggested in Strasburg II).
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In the progression from Mathews to Schall to Salerno, the Ma-
thews tripartite analysis has shrunk to a two-sided balancing test, still
bearing the Mathews name.
4. Inverting the Presumption of Innocence
One result of Schall's incremental revisions of constitutional
precedent has been a steady erosion in the presumption of inno-
cence throughout the criminal process. As lamented by Justice Mar-
shall in his Schall and Salerno dissents and by a number of commen-
tators, Schall and Salerno have opened wide the circumstances in
which an individual can be jailed before trial. 2" Indeed, each small
doctrinal revision has contributed significantly to this process.
This erosion of a presumption of innocence affects the govern-
ment interest. The subtraction of five Kennedy factors and the var-
iable application of the seventh narrowed the definition of punish-
ment, allowing far more governmental activity to come under the
" regulation" rubric. The deletion of the Mathews second criterion
reduces the government's duty to provide reasonably accurate pro-
cedures and creates a two-sided balance between individual and
governmental interests instead of the three-part analysis originally
intended by Mathews. The Court has marshalled exceptions to the
rule against detention without criminal conviction to demonstrate
the importance of governmental objectives, and the substitution of
the "legitimate regulatory interest" standard has tilted the new trun-
cated Mathews balance firmly in the government's direction.
On the side of the individual's liberty, the recasting of Gerstein
as an endorsement of pre-trial detention de-emphasized the ac-
cused's post-arrest pre-trial rights and legitimized his extended pre-
trial detention. The Schall decision emphasized ways in which the
juvenile's specific individual liberty interest in the case was weaker
than most. The Salerno opinion, however, drew from Schall its sup-
posed emphasis on the weightiness of the competing governmental
interest.
Because of Schall and its progeny, the presumption of inno-
cence now stands in considerable peril. The Bell Court laid the
249 United Stales v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2109-11 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Bell leaves open the question of the scope of permissible treatment of a detainee once in
custody. See supra notes 64-81 and accompanying text for a discussion or Bell.
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foundation for a substantial inversion of the doctrine, by describing
the presumption as little more than an evidentiary rule:
a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal
trials; it also may serve as an admonishment to the jury to
judge an accused's guilt or innocence solely on the evi-
dence adduced at trial and not on the basis of suspicions
that may arise from the fact of his arrest, indictment, or
custody, or from other matters not introduced as proof at
trial . . . . But it has no application to a determination of the
rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial
has even begun. 244
The logical extension of Bell, as continued in Schall and Salerno,
could destroy the protection provided by the presumption of in-
nocence. Without the first five Kennedy factors, the loss of liberty
suffered by pre-trial detainees will seldom be considered punish-
ment. Without the protection of the second Mathews criterion, in-
nocent defendants will be held in detention based on erroneous
predictions about their dangerousness. With Gerstein recast in such
a way as to justify protracted pre-trial detention and Schall and
Salerno firmly in place, increasing numbers of wrongly detained,
unconvicted defendants will be physically restrained, perhaps for
long periods before trial, based on no proof by any standard that they
have committed a crime. Such defendants would be released only
after a trier of fact judged them to be not guilty.
Thus, the Supreme Court's lack of candor in transforming
precedent has seriously jeopardized the presumption of innocence.
The logical extension of the current trends leads to a system in
which wrongly detained, unconvicted defendants will suffer a sig-
nificant loss of liberty until proven innocent. 245 Such a system re-
duces axiomatic concerns of earlier Supreme Courts to mere voices
crying in the wilderness: "It is critical that the moral force of the
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people
in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. "246
2" Bell v, Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (emphasis added).
25 See, e.g., Comment, The Supreme Court, 1983 Tenn: 4. Pretrial Detintion of Juveniles, 98
liARV, L, REV. 87, 130 (1984); Comment, Pretrial Detainment: The Fruitless Search for the
Presumption of Innocence, 47 Onio Sr. L.J. 277 (1986); Note, Juvenile Law—Pretrial Preventive
Detention Under N.Y. Statute Upheld, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 111 (1985); Note, Criminal Procedure-
Juveniles—State Law Authorizing Pretrial Detention of Juveniles Upon a Finding of Risk of Future
Criminal Béhavior Upheld as Valid Under the Due Process Clause, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1986).
246 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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V. CONCLUSION
In its Schall opinion, the six-justice Supreme Court majority
certainly did not "leave prior decisional law as [it found] it and
simply apply it to the case at bar." 247 Distortions of influential con-
stitutional precedent riddle the opinion. These distortions in the
Schall opinion have now been "searchingly, even tediously, exam-
ined."248
 In contrast to its own claims, the Schall majority, based on
major misrepresentations of prior decisional law, has written a re-
visionist view of constitutional jurisprudence.
The Salerno opinion demonstrates the ripple effect caused by
Schall even outside the juvenile justice arena. The cumulative impact
of the doctrinal revisions worked by Schall suggests substantial dan-
ger to vital civil and criminal constitutional doctrines, most impor-
tantly the doctrine of the presumption of innocence.
Had the Court acknowledged that it was overruling Gault and
its progeny as well as Mathews, Kennedy, and Gerstein, the magnitude
of this revolution would have been apparent. The Court's decision
to move constitutional jurisprudence in dramatic new directions
could then have been openly understood and evaluated. Such dra-
matic shifts by the Court are not unprecedented, but historically
they have been received by public debate, testing whether the
Court's directions coincide with prevailing public values.
Instead, the Schall Court has disguised its purposes through
distortion of precedent, imposing what might be called a form of
preventive detention on settled precedent. Just as family court
judges now may restrain and disempower children without probable
cause in the name of protecting them, so too the Court in Bell,
Schall, and Salerno has restrained and disempowered cases, like
Kennedy, Mathews, and Gerstein, in the name of following them. Just
as wrongly detained juveniles will not be released until advocates
demonstrate their innocence to an authority powerful enough to
free them, so too these wrongly construed precedents will remain
247 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.17 (1979).
"1 BLACK, supra note 192, at 116. Black discussed the Jurek opinion at length to dem-
onstrate the Texas statute's "plain shabbiness, ... its self-speaking insufficiency as law." Id.
at 118. In that connection he wrote:
A year ago, I would have thought that unnecessary. I would have thought that
the trained intuition of any seasoned lawyer would recognize at once, in this
grimly silly statute, something far beyond serious consideration—much as one
can tell that a batter has struck out without calculating the number of nitrogen
molecules between the bat and the ball.
Id. at 118-19.
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caged in distortion until advocates convince the Court, or perhaps
Congress, to free them.
Both opponents and proponents of the Schall result must view
with disquiet the pervasive lack of judicial candor through which
this result was reached. Scholars interested in pursuing the larger
issue of judicial candor can draw profitably from several scholarly
discussions of the issue, 249 and judicial statements.2" Those who are
disturbed that Chief justice Rehnquist authored Schall, along with
Bell and Salerno, may wish to consider this essay's conclusions in
light of David Shapiro's early examination of the Chief Justice's
decisional writing. 2" Scholars concerned with the development of
juvenile jurisprudence can examine whether the Schall analysis has
been consistently applied in subsequent cases involving children's
constitutional rights. 252
249 Cf. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON-LAW FOR TOE AGE OF STATUTES, 172-81, 294-99 (1982);
Posner, The Jurisdiction of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 863-65 (1988); Schauer, Precedent,
39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987); Rosenfeld, The Peppered Moth, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19, 1989 at 2, col.
3.
259 Cf. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
251 Shapiro, in a 1976 critique of Justice Rehnquist's judicial craft, noted:
Justice Rehnquist has expressed the view that constitutional holdings are
more open to reexamination than are other holdings. Given that his ideology
is quite different from that of most Justices recently on the Court, and that he
is intent upon implementi4 this ideology whenever an opportunity presents
itself, one would expect that Justice Rehnquist would frequently advocate re-
jection of the holdings or rationales of prior decisions. What is called for in this
process, I believe, is complete candor. If a decision is to be overruled, or its
rationale rejected, it should be done with the fullest possible explanation of the
reasons for doing so ... .
. . [Tho often, his efforts to deal with prior decisions are singularly
unpersuasive and leave the reader with the impression that the law is being
changed without acknowledgment that candor would demand.
Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 MARY, L. Ray. 293, 349-50 (1976)
(footnotes and citations omitted). Shapiro also notes, inter alia, that 'justice Rehnquist's
opinions . . are inconsistent with or make irrelevant much previous decisional law based on
different conceptions of due process guarantees." Id. at 322.
252 For instance, the Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services
did not find that "the State must play its part as parens patriae" even in a case where parental
control had clearly "faltered." 109 S. Ct. 998, 1004-06 (1989).
In DeShaney, the Court, by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that a county's failure to protect
a child at risk who had previously been in foster care did not amount to a violation of the
child's due process rights. In that case, the state caseworker had, in the majority's words,
"continuing suspicions that someone in the DeShaney household was physically abusing
Joshua, but she did nothing more." DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1001. The Schall opinion was not
cited at all in the DeShaney decision. Yet, surely the State knew that parental control was
faltering, if not worse. Must not the State, therefore, "play its part as parens patriae?" See
supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state's parens patriae duty.
Even a preliminary analysis suggests that failure to cite Schall was a failure to extend
logically the expansive legal propositions created in Schall.
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Identifying the gap between stated and actual practice has been
disturbing enough. By its disingenuous "faithfulness" to precedent,
the Supreme Court has revised its own past history, confused its
present audience and jeopardized the future of a coherent body of
constitutional jurisprudence. The widespread effects of a case such
as &hall v. Martin can only suggest that this Court's transformation
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